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Copyright law, precisely because it has taken shape around the 
model of a book communicated to the public by multiplication of 
copies, has experienced difficulty, not to say frustration, with cases 
where communication is by performance or representation.1 
  – Judge Benjamin Kaplan 
orks of authorship are intangible arrangements of words, 
numbers, lines, shapes, colors, notes, sounds, and the like, 
 
∗ Clinical Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. 
1 Benjamin Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phonograph 
Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 473 (1955). 
W
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which must be materially rendered in order to become perceptible to 
the reader, listener, or viewer.  The law of copyright accommodates 
the reality of physical embodiment by making fixation in a tangible 
form the threshold requirement for protection.  The transformation of 
intangible expression to tangible copy, in turn, gives rise to the 
marketplace in copies and performances.  Copies and performances 
are manifestations of works—that is, ways of rendering them—as a 
result of which they can be perceived and communicated.  We rely on 
this system of copies and performances, together with their attendant 
rights—reproduction, distribution, performance, and display—to turn 
works of authorship into literary, musical, and artistic property.2  
What continually disrupts and unsettles the relationship between 
copies and performances, however, are the technologies we use for 
making and distributing copies of works, as well as for recording and 
transmitting performances of them. 
The latest chapter in the long-running story about the interplay 
between copying and performance was written by the Second Circuit 
in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,3 a clash between a 
 
2 Reproduction and distribution together compose the familiar copyright concept of 
“publication.”  Publication might be thought of as the core right of copyright, as well as, 
traditionally, the primary interest of the copyright owner.  Performances of works may also 
be “published,” i.e., physically distributed, either in the form of copies (“phonorecords” 
for musical works and films, tapes, DVDs, etc., for audiovisual works) or through 
electronic transmission (radio, cable, Internet, etc.). 
 When a performance is transmitted, its transient sounds and images are made 
perceptible to the listener or viewer through a receiving device, but they are not 
necessarily fixed by the device for subsequent retrieval.  A performance that is transmitted 
over radio or television or that is streamed over the Internet, therefore, usually doesn’t 
implicate the reproduction right, but see infra note 80, although what is performed usually 
emanates from the playing of a “mechanical” (nowadays, electronic) or machine-readable 
copy.  Even in the case of live performances, the performers are presumably reading from 
a copy of the work that they are performing, unless the work is improvised by the 
performers themselves. 
3 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009).  Cartoon Network is 
a cable channel controlled by Time Warner, Inc., and CSC Holdings is the name of 
Cablevision’s operating company.  The Second Circuit reversed Judge Denny Chin’s 
decision in the district court.  See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. 
Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  In the Supreme Court, the appeal of Cartoon 
Network was filed as Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) (No. 08-448), 2008 WL 4484597.  The content 
providers involved in the final stage of the litigation, who were listed for the Supreme 
Court as petitioners (i.e., the “studios”), were Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
Universal City Studios Productions LLLP, Paramount Pictures Corp., Disney Enterprises, 
Inc., CBS Broadcasting, Inc., American Broadcasting Co., Inc., NBC Studios, Inc., 
Cartoon Network, Inc., Cable News Network, Inc., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc., Turner 
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consortium of content providers and the Long Island-based cable 
television network.  The story this time around centered on the second 
generation of “time-shifting” technology: the digital video recorder 
(DVR).  The DVR—like a videocassette recorder (VCR)—is a 
machine that records televised programming.  It does so, however, in 
digital rather than analog form, and it saves the programming on a 
hard disk drive, rather than on a spool of magnetic tape. 
I 
REPRISE OF THE BETAMAX CASE? 
Cablevision’s “RS-DVR” will be a networked version of the DVR.  
The “RS” stands for “remote storage”;4 the subscriber who uses the 
RS-DVR will select the TV programming to be time-shifted, but the 
programming will be recorded by Cablevision’s automated equipment 
and saved in Cablevision’s central data storage for playback at a later 
time on the subscriber’s command.5  When Cablevision’s automated 
data storage system records a broadcast at the request of an individual 
subscriber, it will save a separate copy of that selection in a file 
designated for the subscriber’s exclusive use.  If 1000 subscribers ask 
for The Sopranos to be recorded between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m., 
EST, then 1000 copies of the program will be saved by Cablevision’s 
system in 1000 separate files.  When subscriber Smith asks for The 
Sopranos to be replayed, a performance of the copy in Smith’s folder 
will be transmitted to Smith’s cable box.  When subscriber Jones asks 
for The Sopranos to be replayed, a different copy of The Sopranos—
the one from Jones’s folder—will be performed and transmitted, even 
though Smith’s and Jones’s copies both had their origins in the same 
HBO telecast. 
Unlike the set-top DVR—which is a stand-alone device that may 
be owned by the customer or rented from the cable company—the 
RS-DVR will be a service provided by Cablevision.  This 
difference—service vs. device—is what distinguished Cartoon 
Network from the celebrated “Betamax” case, Sony Corp. of America 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,6 in which the Supreme Court held that 
 
Network Sales, Inc., Turner Classic Movies, Inc., and Turner Network Television, Inc.  
See id. at iii–vi. 
4 See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 123. 
5 Id. at 124. 
6 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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a manufacturer of video cassette recorders could not be held liable for 
contributory infringement based on unauthorized copying by 
individuals who used their own Betamaxes to record and view 
copyrighted television programs.7  It is also, however, what made 
Cablevision vulnerable to a charge of direct infringement.8 
 
7 Id. at 442–47.  Sony was absolved from contributory infringement principally because 
its Betamax VCR was found to have “substantial noninfringing uses,” viz., it could be 
used to record unprotected material.  Id. at 418.  Because the VCR is a multi-use 
technology rather than one that is useful only for infringing, Sony’s awareness of the 
potential infringing home uses of its machine was no more than “equivocal.”  Id.; cf. 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 932–33 (2005) 
(noting that Sony “absolves the equivocal conduct of selling an item with substantial 
lawful as well as unlawful uses”).  In addition, there was no underlying direct infringement 
by the home viewers who purchased Sony’s VCRs because their “time-shifting” of 
broadcast television programming was by and large excusable as fair use.  Sony, 464 U.S. 
at 447–57. 
8 The studios did not charge Cablevision with contributory infringement, perhaps 
assuming that Sony shielded Cablevision from this claim.  Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 
124.  For its part, Cablevision did not assert a fair use defense.  Id.  In opposing the 
studios’ attempt to get a hearing by the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General, Elena 
Kagan, argued that the omission of these “two critical issues” was an “artificial truncation 
of the possible grounds for decision” and made the case “an unsuitable vehicle for 
clarifying the proper application of copyright principles to technologies like the one at 
issue here.”  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Cable News Network, Inc. 
v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) (No. 08-448), 2009 WL 1511740 
[hereinafter S.G. Brief].  However, Kagan recognized that network-based services raise 
important copyright issues that are likely to recur in other contexts, and she left the door 
open to changing the government’s position if a circuit split later develops.  See id. at 7 & 
n.3.  For two obvious reasons, the studios probably would not have gotten very far on a 
theory of contributory infringement: (1) the likelihood that there will be no underlying 
direct infringement because the time-shifting by Cablevision’s subscribers will be a 
permissible fair use, and (2) Sony’s expansive safe harbor for new technology with 
substantial, non-infringing uses.  The Second Circuit hinted, however, that it might have 
viewed the “volitional copying” issue more favorably for the studios had they framed it as 
a contributory rather than a direct infringement claim because of a fact that distinguished 
the case from Sony—the “ongoing relationship” between Cablevision and its RS-DVR 
subscribers.  See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 132–33 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 437–38).  
(The “volitional copying” issue is briefly explained in infra note 81.) 
 On the other hand, it was possible that a Cablevision fair use defense might have 
succeeded, although Cablevision would have had to overcome the problem that the Second 
Circuit had rejected a similar tactic ten years earlier.  See Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. 
Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108–12 (2d Cir. 1998) (retransmission of radio broadcasts by 
operator of telephone monitoring service was not a fair use). 
 A related question was whether Cablevision, if denied a fair use defense on its own 
behalf, could have asserted that it was acting for the benefit of its subscribers.  This too, 
however, would have been a long shot because for-profit businesses are generally not 
allowed to stand in the shoes of their customers for the purposes of fair use.  See, e.g., 
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(en banc).  In any event, Cablevision—as it turned out, wisely—chose not to assert a fair 
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On the charge of direct infringement, two legal questions were 
posed by this arrangement:  First, will Cablevision—by copying the 
works that it broadcasts in real time and later playing back these 
individual copies to the subscribers who requested them—
“reproduce” and then “perform” the protected works via transmission 
over its network?  Second, if so, should these unauthorized 
performances be considered “public,” and therefore infringing, or 
“private,” and therefore not?  The crux of the dispute, in other words, 
was the legal concept of public performance.  At the most 
fundamental level, the question of public performance required the 
court to determine exactly what Cablevision would be storing and 
then streaming. 
II 
THE PHENOMENON OF PHYSICAL EMBODIMENT 
In a twist on the copyright principle of “originality,” the dispute 
was over the provenance of the copy rather than the provenance of the 
work—and not just the provenance of the copy, but the provenance of 
the performance of the copy.  Once more, the puzzle presented by 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR service arises from the phenomenon of 
physical embodiment. 
Musical or dramatic works may be manifested in the form of 
performances as well as in the form of copies, and thus they may be 
experienced by members of the public when they are published in 
textual copies or performed in different media.9  The relationships 
between these manifestations seem like they should be simple enough 
to explain, given that the author is the origin of the work and that 
what an author initially creates is a work, not a copy or a performance 
of one.  Intuitively, the work always comes first, then the copy, then 
the performance, regardless of who is doing the copying or 
performing. 
In the traditional, non-improvisatory situation, the author makes a 
copy of the work, “fixed in [a] tangible medium of expression,”10 and 
then a performer reads from that copy (i.e., recites, renders, plays, 
 
use defense of any type, and the studios obviously couldn’t do it on Cablevision’s behalf.  
See infra text accompanying notes 161–74, for a discussion of the fair use issue. 
9 See GÉRARD GENETTE, THE WORK OF ART: IMMANENCE AND TRANSCENDENCE 91–
99 (G.M. Goshgarian trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1997) (1994). 
10 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
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dances, or acts) to realize the work in the form of a live 
performance.11  In the electronic variant of that situation, a live 
performance, rendered traditionally, is recorded on a copy or 
“phonorecord,” which is then played back (“performed”) by a viewer 
or listener, who activates it on some type of mechanical or electronic 
device or, in the case of a transmission, receives the playback of the 
recording on a television or radio receiver.  This variant describes 
audiovisual works, such as movies and prerecorded TV programs,12 
as well as most sound recordings.13 
The problem bequeathed by the twentieth century’s technologies of 
copying and performance is that recorded performances themselves 
can be copied, and those copies, in turn, can be “performed,” that is, 
rendered by means of machines that are designed to make the 
recorded performances perceptible.  This broad notion of performance 
is mandated by the statute, which defines to “perform” as “to recite, 
render, play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means of any device 
or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds 
accompanying it audible.”14 
 
11 See Sara K. Stadler, Performance Values, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 697, 700, 708–10 
(2008) (describing origins of performance rights in live performances from textual copies). 
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  The statute defines “audiovisual works” as “works that 
consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the 
use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together 
with accompanying sounds.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
13 Id.  The statute defines “sound recordings” as “works that result from the fixation of a 
series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.”  Id.  Although this definition is broad enough 
to cover recordings of sounds that aren’t also performances of works (such as bird calls or 
street noises), a copyrighted sound recording in the music industry is almost invariably a 
reproduction of a performance that consists of an underlying work (usually a musical 
composition) and a performance of that work. 
14 Id. (emphasis added).  The legislative history elaborates on this definition. 
[T]he concepts of public performance and public display cover not only the 
initial rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or 
showing is transmitted or communicated to the public.  Thus, for example: a 
singer is performing when he or she sings a song; a broadcasting network is 
performing when it transmits his or her performance (whether simultaneously or 
from records); a local broadcaster is performing when it transmits the network 
broadcast; a cable television system is performing when it retransmits the 
broadcast to its subscribers; and any individual is performing when whenever he 
or she plays a phonorecord embodying the performance or communicates the 
performance by turning on a receiving set. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5678 
(emphasis added). 
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This broad definition leads to a crucial difference between the legal 
notions of copying and performance.  It is well understood that 
multiple textual copies of a work all embody the same work, as long 
as the texts of all the copies are exactly reproduced.15  Although their 
value as copies will be degraded if they are not authentic (i.e., 
textually accurate), the primary legal concern is whether they are 
authorized (i.e., copied lawfully).  When performances are 
reproduced, however, it’s a trick question to ask whether all copies of 
a performance embody the same performance or whether each copy 
instead embodies its own distinct performance.  This is because 
recorded performances can themselves be copied, and often are.  
Serially created copies that originate from the same performance are 
all recordings, or copies, of the same performance.  However, each 
time a copy of a performance is played (or “performed”), a distinct 
new performance is rendered.  These new performances are 
performances of the copy as well as renderings of the performance in 
the copy. 
III 
COPYING AND PERFORMING 
The issues and arguments on either side of the Cartoon Network 
case tracked the intertwined rights invoked by the studios—
reproduction and performance.  Cablevision, as defendant, had to win 
on both issues because infringement of either right would result in 
liability, while the studios only had to win on one.  Cablevision 
argued that the copies made for its RS-DVR service will be lawfully 
made because they will be remotely initiated by the home viewers, 
even though ordered through Cablevision’s network and archived on 
its equipment.16  Cablevision further maintained that its transmissions 
 
15 See Jeffrey Malkan, What is a Copy?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 419, 425 n.24 
(2005).  This is only true of textual copies, that is, copies of literary and dramatic works 
(as well as scores of musical works).  Id.  The case is different for pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works.  Id.  For those artworks (leaving aside the special cases of serially 
produced prints or sculptures cast from molds), the only authentic copy is the first one 
made by the artist; the rest are reproductions.  Id. 
16 See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 2008).  
This raised the peripheral question of whether the court could decide against Cablevision 
without taking sides in a contest between competing technology platforms.  The network 
vs. device question was put to the Second Circuit in an amicus brief by Professor Timothy 
Wu of Columbia Law School. Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Timothy Wu in Support 
of Reversal, Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1480-cv(L)), 2007 
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from the remote storage facility to the viewers’ cable boxes will not 
be public performances because each transmission will emanate from 
a unique copy and be accessible only to the individual viewer who 
ordered that copy.17 
The studios responded that, even though the copying process will 
be automated, Cablevision will be responsible for making the RS-
DVR copies because there is no “automation exception” for copyright 
infringement and the copying will be done on a system designed, 
owned, and maintained by Cablevision for the sole purpose of 
copying its own TV programs.18  Because this copying will be 
unauthorized and unexcused, Cablevision will infringe their 
reproduction rights.19  The studios also denied that Cablevision’s RS-
 
WL 6101597.  He argued that the court should not handicap the technology race between 
networked “cloud” computing and dispersed “desktop” computing by penalizing a storage 
and retrieval process that could be performed more efficiently on a network.  See id. at 12–
17.  The flip side to this rationale was the studios’ objection that Cablevision’s technology 
is, in fact, inefficient: there is no technical benefit to making and storing thousands of 
personal copies of its linear programming, rather than using one master copy to satisfy all 
customer orders.  See Brief of Plaintiffs-Counter-Defendants-Appellees Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp., et al. at 26 n.3, Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-
1480-cv(L)), 2007 WL 6101619 [hereinafter Fox Brief].  They argued that the only reason 
for Cablevision to save all of these duplicative copies would be the legal one of 
distinguishing RS-DVR from VOD.  See id. 
17 Brief and Special Appendix for Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants at 57, 
Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d 121 (2008) (No. 07-1480-cv(L)) [hereinafter Cablevision 
Brief]. 
18 See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 126.  The system will make buffer copies of 
Cablevision’s entire programming stream, and then select particular programs to preserve 
in the form of RS-DVR copies for subscribers who ordered them.  See id. at 124–25.  
Cablevision argued that the buffer copies will be too transient to qualify as “fixed,” and 
that the RS-DVR copies will be made by the subscribers themselves, through the remote 
operation of their cable boxes, rather than by Cablevision.  See id. at 129–30.  The Second 
Circuit accepted both of these defenses, id. at 127–33, but intimated that the latter issue 
might have gone in favor of the studios had they framed it in terms of contributory rather 
than direct infringement, see id. at 132–33. 
19 See Brief of Plaintiffs-Counterclaim-Defendants-Appellees at 27–47, Cartoon 
Network, 536 F.3d 121 (2008) (No. 07-1480(cv)(L)).  The question of who will “perform” 
the copies—Cablevision or the home viewer—mirrored the question of who will 
“reproduce” the copies.  On this issue, the most important difference between the 
reproduction and performance rights is that one party (Cablevision) or the other (the home 
viewer) must be assigned responsibility for copying the televised broadcast, that is, for 
being the direct infringer.  The options are mutually exclusive.  (It would have been 
possible, of course, to find that only the home viewer will directly infringe, but that 
Cablevision will contributorily infringe by facilitating the infringement.)  In contrast, both 
the Cablevision and the home viewer could have been found fully responsible for 
performing the work when a program is transmitted to a viewer through a network–
Cablevision by transmitting it and the home viewer by receiving it (that is, “playing” it on 
a radio or TV set). 
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DVR performances—that is, its transmissions to the individual 
viewers—will be private.  It doesn’t matter, they argued, that these 
transmissions will emanate from custom-made copies.20  Whether 
Cablevision stores one master copy of its entire program schedule or 
multiple, personal copies of the various programs on the schedule 
won’t affect the studios’ performance rights because each 
performance that Cablevision streams through its RS-DVR service 
will be a performance of a program that was previously telecast on 
Cablevision’s linear programming schedule and licensed only for the 
initial, real-time transmission.21 
IV 
MYSTERIES OF THE “TRANSMIT CLAUSE” 
The starting point for analyzing this impasse is the statutory 
definition of public performance and, specifically, the second 
paragraph—known as the “transmit clause.” 
 To perform or display a work “publicly” means— 
 (1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at 
any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a 
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or 
 (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or 
display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the 
public, by means of any device or process, whether the members of 
the public capable of receiving the performance or display receive it 
 
 This is because transmitting a performance and receiving a transmission are both 
recognized to be legal performances of the work, under the “multiple performance” 
doctrine, first articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis in 1931, see Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle 
Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931), and rejuvenated by the definition of public 
performance in the Copyright Act of 1976, see supra note 14.  (In the interim between 
1931 and 1976, the doctrine’s viability had been thrown into doubt by the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 396 
n.18 (1968), and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 
394, 406–10 (1974)). 
 The Second Circuit in Cartoon Network declined to answer the question of who will be 
performing the RS-DVR copies, but warned rather cryptically that even if the subscriber, 
rather than Cablevision, will be doing the “copying,” it does not necessarily follow that the 
subscriber, rather than Cablevision, will also be doing the “performing” because “[t]he 
definitions that delineate the contours of the reproduction and public performance rights 
vary in significant ways.”  Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134. 
20 Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 135–36. 
21 Id. at 136. 
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in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at 
different times.22 
The language in the transmit clause that causes the interpretive 
problem is the closing phrase, “separate places/different times.”  This 
provision expands “publicly” to mean that the “members of the 
public” who receive a transmission do not need to be gathered 
together, either spatially or temporally.23 
The spatial aspect of “separate places/different times” is easy 
enough to understand.  The people who receive a transmission may be 
physically dispersed; the very concept of broadcasting is based on the 
notion that a program goes out electronically to people who will 
receive it in different places.  When FDR gave his fireside chats, for 
example, he addressed the American public, but the public did not 
need to gather in one place to join his audience.  That was the magic 
of radio. 
The temporal aspect of “separate places/different times,” though, is 
more opaque.  No doubt this language confirms that a radio or TV 
transmission can be time staggered.  When such time staggering might 
be relevant to a performance rights claim, however, is not clear from 
the statute or its legislative history.  The contiguous forty-eight states 
have four time zones, and a broadcast network may choose to transmit 
a program at different times for different zones.  Even though viewers 
in the West may receive a program three hours later than those in the 
East, the transmit clause says they all still belong to the same viewing 
“public.”  Of course, such nationwide broadcasts would be public 
anyway, so this application of the “different times” provision would 
serve only to confirm the obvious.24 
It is also unclear how Congress intended the spatial and the 
temporal aspects to affect each other.  How should the “ors” and the 
“ands” in the “separate times/different places” phrase be parsed?  The 
language allows four alternatives.  Members of the public may be: (1) 
in the same place at the same time, (2) in separate places at the same 
time, (3) in the same place at different times, or (4) in separate places 
at different times. 
One and two are easy to illustrate.  (1) Everyone is gathered in a 
theater to watch a concert or sporting event that is televised by a 
 
22 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
23 See id. 
24 See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
8.14[C][3] (2006). 
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closed-circuit TV transmission.  (2) Everyone watches the televised 
event on his or her TVs at home. 
The third alternative, however, is more difficult to illustrate (the 
illustration will be the Redd Horne case, below), and the last is even 
more so.  Indeed, the statutory language is downright ambiguous on 
the final point.  Did Congress intend for a complete disjunction 
between the places and times where a transmission is received by an 
audience?  Doesn’t something, either time or place, have to remain 
the same in order to constitute the audience as a “public” one? 
V 
MAXWELL’S VIDEO SHOWCASE 
Melville Nimmer provided the theoretical framework for 
understanding the statute’s “separate places/different times” 
provision, and in real life, a quartet of cases that originated in the 
Third and Ninth Circuits provided the illustrations.  The cases relied 
on Professor Nimmer, and Professor Nimmer, in subsequent editions 
of his treatise, reflected upon and generally approved the cases that 
applied his analysis.25 
Nimmer’s discussion of “separate places/different times” is divided 
into two headings, “Performances in Which the Audience is 
Geographically Dispersed” and “Performances in Which the 
Audience is Chronologically Dispersed.”26  Under the 
“chronological” heading, he pointed out the difficulty of taking the 
“different times” provision at face value.27  If taken literally, he 
wrote, the playing of a phonograph record in the privacy of one’s own 
home would be a public performance because “other members of the 
public will be playing duplicates of the same recorded performance 
‘at different times.’”28  Because all recorded copies of a musical 
 
25 See Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 581, 
595–96 (2004). 
26 See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 24, at § 8.14[C][2]–[3]. 
27 Id. at § 8.14[C][3]. 
28 Id. at § 8.14[C][3].  Nimmer’s example failed to illustrate the point he was trying to 
make because the phrase “separate places/different times” is quoted from the “transmit 
clause,” and a phonograph record played at home isn’t a transmission of a performance, 
even under the Copyright Act’s expansive definition of “transmit.”  See id.  This is 
because the recording would be considered a mechanical copy of the work rather than any 
kind of performance of it.  The composer accordingly would be entitled only to the 
compulsory license fees for mechanical copies specified by section 115.  See 17 U.S.C. § 
115(a) (2006).  Subsequently, the composer might receive performances royalties if the 
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performance embed the same live performance, the playing of each 
copy is a discrete performance (i.e., private), but it is also a repetition 
of the original, embedded performance (i.e., public).29 
Nimmer found a fact to salvage “separate places/different times” 
by identifying something in a transmission that remains the same, 
despite the otherwise puzzling disjunction between the places and 
times where it may be received.  “Upon reflection,” he wrote, “it 
would seem that what must have been intended was that if the same 
copy (or phonorecord) of a given work is repeatedly played (i.e., 
‘performed’) by different members of the public, albeit at different 
times, this constitutes a ‘public’ performance.”30  A ready example of 
Nimmer’s solution to the “different times” puzzle might have been 
the video rental scenario.  At first glance it would appear that 
videotape and DVD rentals—where the same copy of a movie is 
repeatedly taken out by different customers—should implicate the 
public performance right because all the performances of that single 
copy are, in the aggregate, performances of the copyrighted work at 
“separate places” and in “different times.”  It is generally recognized, 
however, that playing a rented video at home is a private, not a public, 
performance because no performances are transmitted, and this results 
despite the transmit clause’s open-ended language.31 
 
recording is publicly performed by transmission to the public or by being played in a 
public place, but he or she would not receive royalties for private performances, such as, in 
Nimmer’s example, when the purchaser of a phonograph record plays it at home.  See id. 
at § 115(a)(1). 
 One of the first comments published on the Cartoon Network case provided a better 
illustration of Nimmer’s point about “separate places/different times.”  “It is fairly obvious 
to say that if I make my own VCR recording of Top Chef and watch it again in my own 
home, then that would not be a public performance, as it would not fall under either clause 
of what is considered a public performance.”  Cindy Abramson, Note and Recent 
Development, Where’s the Remote? The Importance of the Location of the Remote Control 
(and the One Who Uses It) in Determining Liability for Copyright Infringement for Remote 
Storage DVRs, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 145, 158 (2009).  This statement is correct, 
but not obviously so because the literal reading supposed by Nimmer would find it 
significant that other members of the viewing public will likely be making their own 
copies of the transmission and viewing them at “separate places” and “different times.”  
Even so, the transmit clause wouldn’t apply here because the homemade video would be 
considered a personal copy made under the privilege of fair use, rather than a time-delayed 
transmission of the telecast.  See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 441, 446–56 (1984).  The subsequent “performance” of the personal copy at 
home, for a single viewer or a family circle, would be a private one. 
29 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 24. 
30 See id. 
31 What makes the clause open-ended is the phrase “transmit or otherwise 
communicate.”  17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).  As expansive as this language is, it 
 2010] The Public Performance Problem in 517 
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 
Nimmer’s own illustration of the “same copy” theory was the 
penny arcade “peep show,” which, again, did not involve any 
transmissions of performances: 
An example of a [public performance] may be seen in the old-
fashioned penny arcade, where a short motion picture sequence 
might be seen in a coin-operated “peep show” device.  No more 
than one person at a time could observe a given performance.  
Nevertheless, the same copy in the coin-operated device would give 
rise to numerous performances seen by the public each day.  It 
would be strange, indeed, to conclude that these were private 
performances simply because only one person at a time observed 
each such performance.32 
The textbook illustration of the “different times” provision—the 
one that Nimmer thought confirmed his “same copy” theory, and one 
that did entail a transmission—arrived in 1984, in a Third Circuit case 
involving a video rental store in Erie, Pennsylvania.  The defendant in 
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc.,33 was 
Maxwell’s Video Showcase, an operation that rented videos in the 
front of the store and provided viewing booths in the rear where 
customers could watch the cassettes they had just rented.34  The twist 
was that the VCRs weren’t located inside the viewing booths 
themselves, but behind the counter in the front of the store.35  One of 
Maxwell’s clerks would place the cassette in the machine and play it; 
the movie would then be transmitted to the nineteen-inch color TV in 
the viewing booth where between two and four people could watch 
it.36 
 
would seem to exclude hand delivery of a physical copy.  The legislative history speaks to 
all conceivable forms of “wired or wireless communications media.”  See David v. 
Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 758–59 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64 (1996)); see also Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Prof’l 
Real Estate Investors, Inc., 866 F.2d 278, 281–82 (9th Cir. 1989) (interpreting “otherwise 
communicate” to refer only to processes that involve electronic transmission devices).  
Nimmer understood Professional Real Estate Investors to “implicitly establish[] that 
videodisk or videotape rental simpliciter is nonactionable.”  See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 24. 
32 Id. (citations omitted).  Of course, the penny arcade itself would easily have qualified 
as a “place open to the public” under the first clause of the statutory definition of public 
performance.  See supra text accompanying note 22. 
33 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984). 
34 Id. at 156–57. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 157.  The viewers could not be unrelated; i.e., they would have to come into the 
store together.  Id. 
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These facts seemed to provide an ideal illustration of Nimmer’s 
theory of “different times.”  The same copy of a cassette would be 
repeatedly played, and not just played but also transmitted from the 
front of the store to the back.37  The decision, however, went off in a 
different direction.  Chief Judge Edward Re held for the plaintiff 
without applying the transmit clause, agreeing instead with the district 
court that the viewing booths themselves were by definition the sites 
of public performances because they were places open to the public.38  
In other words, he defined the relevant place where the copies were 
“performed” as the entire store, rather than the individual booths.39  
(In fact, it could have been argued that the copies weren’t performed 
in the booths, where the TVs were located, but behind the front desk, 
where the VCRs were located.  Either way, it made sense to frame the 
site of performance to include both the VCRs and the TV sets.40)  
“Simply because the cassettes can be viewed in private,” he wrote, 
“does not mitigate the essential fact that Maxwell’s is unquestionably 
open to the public.”41  He therefore found it “unnecessary to examine 
the second part of the statutory definition,” that is, the transmit 
clause.42  Nevertheless, perhaps oddly, he did so anyway, albeit in 
dicta.  He quoted Nimmer’s treatise and applied the single-copy 
rationale to the facts before him.  “Although Maxwell’s has only one 
 
37 Id. at 156–57. 
38 Id. at 158–59. 
39 Id.  In other words, he chose to frame the site of the disputed “performance” broadly, 
which made it a public place, rather than narrowly, which would have made it a private 
one.  See infra note 139 and accompanying text. 
40 The judge in On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries thought that 
a “performance occurs where it is received,” that is, in the case of a movie video, “only 
when it is visible and audible.”  777 F. Supp. 787, 789 (N.D. Cal. 1991).  This would mean 
in Redd Horne that the performance of the videos occurred only in the viewing booths.  
However, this conclusion would be inconsistent with the legislative history, see supra note 
14, and generally with the multiple performance doctrine, according to which a work is 
“performed” on both ends of a transmission—both by the sender and the receiver, see text 
accompanying infra note 132. 
41 Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159.  In fact, the “transmit clause” dictum provides a better 
ratio decidendi than the court’s principal holding, which was not very persuasive.  An old-
fashioned telephone booth, the obvious analogue, is open to any member of the public who 
wants to use it, but once in use, the person inside is entitled to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (delineating a Fourth 
Amendment privacy right).  The same was no doubt true of Maxwell’s viewing booths, 
which, unlike telephone booths, presumably did not have transparent doors. 
42 Redd Horne, 749 F.2d at 159. 
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copy of each film, it shows each copy repeatedly to different members 
of the public.  This constitutes a public performance.”43 
Two years later, another Third Circuit case came along to push the 
Redd Horne envelope.  The defendant in Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc. maintained stores that likewise rented 
videocassettes and provided viewing rooms.44  Aveco’s VCRs, 
however, were located inside the rooms, not behind the front desk, 
and Aveco allowed its customers to choose between renting a video to 
play in a rented room, renting a room without a video, or renting a 
video for out-of-store viewing.45  The in-store performances weren’t 
transmitted from one place to another but rather were played by the 
customers inside the rooms they had rented.46  Therefore, the transmit 
clause wasn’t implicated.  The court nevertheless summoned Redd 
Horne’s “open to the public” rationale—its dubious principal 
holding—to determine that these performances were “public” because 
the rented rooms were analogous to public places like telephone 
booths, taxi cabs, and pay toilets.47  This result is only convincing if 
one thinks that telephone booths and the like are truly public places 
and that in-store performances of rented videos are therefore more 
“public” than those done by customers who take their videos home to 
watch.  As precedent, Aveco is weaker than Redd Horne because the 
court in Aveco couldn’t attach any decisional significance to the fact 
that the same copy would be viewed repeatedly, that is, “at different 
times.”48 
The next logical step would be to ask whether videos played by 
guests in hotel rooms could violate the public performance right.  The 
two possible scenarios would involve videos transmitted from the 
hotel’s front desk or those played on a machine located in the guest’s 
room.  Only the former would implicate the transmit clause.  In short 
 
43 Id.  A public performance in “different times,” one might note, but not in “separate 
places.” 
44 800 F.2d 59, 60 (3d Cir. 1986). 
45 Id. at 61. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 63. 
48 Nimmer nevertheless thought Aveco was correctly decided because “the defendant 
has usurped the copyright owner’s right to authorize public performances merely by 
furnishing the public viewing facility.”  2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 24 (assuming 
the “viewing facility” was public).  Nimmer also thought that, even though the tapes 
weren’t played and transmitted by Aveco, the store might still be liable as a contributory 
infringer.  Id. (assuming Aveco’s customers were infringers). 
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order, the two cases that realized these possibilities were decided in 
California: Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real 
Estate Investors, Inc.49 and, not long afterward, On Command Video 
Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries.50 
In the Professional Real Estate Investors case, the lobby gift shop 
rented movies, which guests could play on projection TVs and 
videodisk players in their rooms.51  The Ninth Circuit initially found 
that the transmit clause didn’t apply to these video rentals because 
they weren’t transmitted anywhere.52  The court therefore limited its 
analysis to whether the hotel rooms themselves were places “open to 
the public.”53  The answer was no.  “While the hotel may indeed be 
‘open to the public,’ a guest’s hotel room, once rented, is not.”54  This 
drew the line, if one needed to be drawn, between in-store viewing 
booths and rented hotel rooms.55  In contrast, the district court in On 
Command Video found that the hotel in that case used a closed-circuit 
system that transmitted movies from a central bank of video players 
to individual guest rooms.56  Each video player, loaded with a 
particular copy of a particular movie, would be played when a guest 
activated it by remote control.57  The court held that the public 
performance right was infringed here by applying the transmit 
clause’s “separate places/different times” provision.58 
In reaching this conclusion, the On Command Video court focused 
on a piece of legislative history59 whose relevance would be viewed 
 
49 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1989). 
50 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
51 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, 866 F.2d at 279. 
52 Id. at 281–82. 
53 Id. at 281. 
54 Id. 
55 Perhaps the line did need drawing.  In Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., the 
Seventh Circuit approved the district court’s jury instruction that “adult films” shown in 
private viewing booths would infringe the public performance right if the video arcades in 
which the booths were located were found to be “open to the public.”  925 F.2d 1010, 
1019 (7th Cir. 1991).  The court stated that it was following Redd Horne and advised that 
it was disagreeing with Professional Real Estate Investors to the extent that the Ninth 
Circuit’s definition of public performance couldn’t be harmonized with the Third’s.  Id. at 
1020.  (Of course it could be harmonized by the fact that a hotel room, unlike a viewing 
booth, is a dwelling place, albeit a transient one.) 
56 On Command Video Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 777 F. Supp. 787, 788 
(N.D. Cal. 1991). 
57 Id. at 788. 
58 Id. at 789–90. 
59 Id. 
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skeptically by the Second Circuit eighteen years later.60  In 1967, a 
House committee had reported that the public performance right, as 
then conceived, was intended to cover transmissions to the public, 
even though the recipients are not gathered in a single place, and 
even if there is no direct proof that any of the potential recipients 
was operating his receiving apparatus at the time of the 
transmission.  The same principles apply whenever the potential 
recipients of the transmission represent a limited segment of the 
public, such as the occupants of hotel rooms . . . ; they are also 
applicable where the transmission is capable of reaching different 
recipients at different times, as in the case of sounds or images 
stored in an information system and capable of being performed or 
displayed at the initiative of individual members of the public.61 
This explanation of “separate places/different times” envisions, in 
practically one breath, both closed-circuit TV systems, as in 
Professional Real Estate Investors, and RS-DVRs, as in Cartoon 
Network.  Its prediction of interactive entertainment systems is either 
prescient or irrelevant, depending on the amount of credence one 
wishes to give a legislative gloss that predates the enactment of the 
present law by almost ten years. 
VI 
THE “VIRTUAL LOCKER” ANALOGY 
The closed-circuit TV system in Professional Real Estate Investors 
illustrated the “different times” provision but not the “separate 
places” one because all of the hotel’s video transmissions would be 
received in the hotel’s own guest rooms.  Likewise, the video 
transmissions in Redd Horne were confined to Maxwell’s own 
viewing booths.62  How much further does copyright’s public 
performance right extend?  The extreme limit on the performance 
right would be a transmission of a performance in which “different 
times” are joined with “separate places.”  Prior to Cartoon Network, 
the only non-hypothetical example of this extreme was the automated 
video rental service known as “video on demand” (VOD).  As noted 
before, brick-and-mortar businesses like the ubiquitous Blockbuster 
aren’t subject to the transmit clause because they traffic in copies, 
 
60 See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2008). 
61 On Command Video Corp., 777 F. Supp. at 790 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 29 
(1967)). 
62 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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physically delivered, rather than in performances, electronically 
transmitted. 
VOD, however, perfectly fits the pattern of Nimmer’s “separate 
places/different times” rationale: the provider maintains a limited 
number of electronic copies—perhaps only one—that it transmits 
over and over again through its network to spatially and temporally 
dispersed customers who order them.  It doesn’t deliver copies of 
movies, but streams performances.  The performances are received by 
customers in “separate places,” that is, in their own homes, and at 
“different times,” that is, whenever they’re ordered.63 
The studios needed to convince the court that RS-DVR is a type of 
VOD and hence subject to their public performance right.  The 
challenge that Cablevision faced was to distinguish RS-DVR from 
VOD.  It would have to convince the court that RS-DVR would not 
give rise to public performances because each RS-DVR transmission 
would emanate from a distinct copy.  This argument capitalized on 
Nimmer’s rationale—that what explains the transmit clause’s 
“different times” provision is that multiple performances of the same 
copy may be transmitted sequentially.  The audience is a “public” one 
only because all of its temporally dispersed members have received 
transmissions that emanated from serial performances of the same 
tangible thing, the copy.  This is why it was to Cablevision’s 
advantage to emphasize the singularity of RS-DVR’s custom-made 
copies, as well as to elevate the narrower concept of transmission over 
the broader one of performance.64 
This strategy obliged Cablevision to admit that any VOD 
transmission—even to a single customer—is a transmission “‘to the 
public’ because any member of the public can receive the offered 
transmission simply by paying the appropriate fee.”65  Exactly so, 
 
63 A final descendant of Redd Horne provides an illegal example of VOD.  In Video 
Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc., the district court in New Jersey 
held that a video clip compiler, who maintained a network for streaming movie previews 
from the Web sites of video retailers to the home computers of their retail customers, was 
publicly performing, without permission, the movies from which the previews were taken.  
192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 332 (D.N.J. 2002), aff’d, 342 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2003). 
64 A transmission of a performance is a type of performance.  See supra note 14.  Of 
course, not all transmissions are performances; other things can be transmitted—most 
relevantly, copies of works via a digital “download.”  See infra note 80 for a discussion of 
downloads. 
65 Reply Brief for Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants at 41, Cartoon Network, 
536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1480-cv(L)), 2007 WL 6101594 [hereinafter 
Cablevision Reply Brief]. 
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Nimmer would say; under the transmit clause, this transmission is a 
public performance because the same copy is performed over and 
over again, and a licensing fee paid each time.  This concession for 
VOD, however, paved the way for the crucial, and saving, distinction 
between VOD and RS-DVR. 
 With the RS-DVR . . . each customer’s recording can be played 
only to the customer who made it—i.e., only to the particular set-top 
box from which it was recorded.  Although the same work may be 
played back to different subscribers, each playback of a subscriber’s 
own personal recording is a separate private performance.  Because 
each “transmission is only available to one person”—the customer 
who made the recording—RS-DVR playback “clearly fails to 
qualify as ‘public.’”66 
The linchpin in Cablevision’s argument was an ingenious analogy.  
The studios claimed that RS-DVR is a type of VOD.67  A different 
analogy would allow the court to see the case differently. 
 The correct analogy for the RS-DVR is not VOD, but the 
“virtual locker” that allows users to store and retrieve their own files 
from a central server.  A virtual locker provider does not “publicly 
perform” a work merely because multiple users happen to store and 
retrieve their own copies of the same song—even when . . . the same 
company also provides the content.68 
The only customer who will be capable of receiving an RS-DVR 
transmission is the one who ordered that copy to be made through 
that cable box.  In contrast, anyone who is willing to pay for a VOD 
viewing is capable of receiving a VOD transmission. 
Where a defendant has one copy of a work and offers to play it for 
anyone willing to pay a fee, the transmissions are “to the public” 
because anyone can receive them.  By contrast, where an individual 
purchases or records his own copy and can play it only to himself, 
the transmission is not generally available.69 
Again, the “virtual locker”—in which personally owned copies of 
performances are remotely stored and streamed back from a network 
“cloud”—provides the better analogy. 
 
66 Id. at 42 (citations omitted) (quoting 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 24, at § 
8.14[C][2]). 
67 Fox Brief, supra note 16, at 11–12. 
68 Cablevision Reply Brief, supra note 65, at 44–45 (citations omitted). 
69 Brief in Opposition at 30, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. 
Ct. 2890 (2009) (No. 08-448), 2008 WL 5168381. 
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If 100 consumers each purchased the same Miles Davis song from 
Apple’s iTunes store, separately stored the song on Apple’s .mac 
remote-storage backup service, and separately listened to their 
respective copies of the song by streaming the song to themselves 
from the remote server, no one would think Apple had publicly 
performed the song.  The RS-DVR is no different.70 
VII 
PERFORMANCES WITHOUT EVER TAKING POSSESSION OF A COPY 
The studios responded with their own story about what RS-DVR 
will be and their own emphasis on how it will operate.  The transmit 
clause’s “different times” provision applies to RS-DVR, they argued, 
because the performance that counts for copyright purposes is the 
original network transmission that will be preserved by the creation of 
the individual copies, rather than the subsequent one that will occur 
when those copies are themselves performed and transmitted by 
means of Cablevision’s RS-DVR service.71  The performance that is 
embedded in the copies will be public, and any subsequent 
performance emanating from those copies will also be public.72  This 
is because copies, quite naturally, inherit the character of the thing 
that they reproduce. 
As a practical matter, the copies will do nothing more than enable 
Cablevision to make time-delayed transmissions of public 
performances.  (Time delay requires that copies of a performance be 
successively replayed, just as any transmission of an audiovisual work 
presupposes the acquisition and performance of a copy.)  These time-
delayed performances will be “public” under the transmit clause, even 
though they will be received at “different times,” because they will be 
part of one extended performance rather than multiple, discrete 
ones.73 
 
70 Id.  Michael Robertson claimed that the Second Circuit’s ruling in the Cartoon 
Network case “set a definitive legal precedence [sic] for other responsibly run media 
storage and delivery services like MP3tunes.”  Michael Robertson, Cloud Video Is Legal, 
How About Cloud Music?, (Aug. 5, 2008), http://michaelrobertson.com/archive.php 
?minute_id=270; cf. Brad Stone & Claire Cain Miller, Music Business Heads into Virtual 
World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/technology 
/internet/16tune.html (reporting Apple’s acquisition of music streaming/storage service 
Lala).  Robertson’s company, MP3.com, was found liable for copyright infringement in 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  See 
infra note 83. 
71 See Fox Brief, supra note 16, at 25–27. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 24. 
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Cablevision’s proposed on-demand service would transmit the 
same performance of a particular program to different members of the 
public who would receive those transmissions at “different times,” 
within the meaning of § 101.  It would transmit that performance (1) 
to certain subscribers simultaneously with the initial performance and 
(2) to a subset of those subscribers on a delayed basis at various times 
of their choosing.74 
The latter option—the RS-DVR “subset”—will be essentially the 
same thing as video on demand, a public performance transmitted to 
subscribers at “different times.”  What of the competing analogy 
between RS-DVR and “virtual lockers”?  In support of the virtual 
locker analogy, again, Cablevision had claimed that the personal 
copies of TV programs stored on its servers were just like personal 
copies of musical performances, lawfully obtained in digital format 
and stored remotely for their customers by music-streaming 
services.75  If it were illegal for Cablevision to stream video 
performances of the customers’ own copies back to their owners, then 
the streaming of musical performances from virtual lockers would be 
illegal as well, including those of lawfully acquired personal copies.76 
The studios fended off the virtual locker analogy by claiming that 
“it is wholly irrelevant, in determining the existence of a public 
performance, whether ‘unique’ copies of the same work are used to 
make the transmissions—or whether those copies were lawfully or 
unlawfully obtained.”77  It all comes down to confusion, the studios 
maintained, about what is being performed and what is being 
transmitted.78 
 Cablevision’s misinterpretation . . . appears predicated upon the 
mistaken notion that Cablevision would transmit the subscriber’s 
“own unique recording” to the subscriber.  Cablevision, however, 
 
74 Id. 
For example, Cablevision would transmit HBO’s telecast of “The Wire” Episode 
48 at 11:00 PM on June 30, 2007 (a) to thousands of its subscribers who pay for 
HBO at 11:00 PM on June 30, 2007; and (b) those subscribers who pay an 
additional fee for RS-DVR at any times of their choosing after 12:00 AM on July 
1, 2007, e.g., to Subscriber X at 8:00 PM on July 1, 2007 and 7:00 PM on July 5, 
2007 and to Subscriber Y at 9:00 PM on August 1, 2007. 
Id. at 24–25. 
75 Brief in Opposition, supra note 69. 
76 Id. 
77 Fox Brief, supra note 16, at 27. 
78 Id. at 27–28. 
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would not transmit the “recording” to anyone; the recording itself 
(the material object in which the program is embodied) would never 
leave Cablevision’s server at its head-end.  Cablevision would 
instead transmit the program, more specifically the performance of 
that program by HBO or another programming service—the same 
performance that Cablevision had transmitted on a real-time basis 
and that it would transmit to multiple subscribers at a different time 
or times.79 
This objection, in one sense, merely states the obvious.  A 
streaming transmission is different from a download.  The former is a 
performance of a copy over a network; the latter is a delivery of a 
copy over a network.80  The infringed right at issue here was 
performance, not distribution, so to point out that Cablevision won’t 
be distributing copies of TV programs only means that the studios 
could not claim infringement of their distribution rights. 
But in another sense, the distinction between streaming and 
downloading is critical because it highlights the difference between 
the “virtual locker” and the RS-DVR storage service.  In the virtual 
 
79 Id. (citation omitted). 
80 The leading case on this point is United States v. American Society of Composers, 
Authors & Publishers (ASCAP), 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  In what the district 
court termed an issue of first impression, it held that the downloading of a digital musical 
file is not a performance of the song embodied in that file.  Id. at 443.  “In order for a song 
to be performed,” Judge William C. Connor stated, “it must be transmitted in a manner 
designed for contemporaneous perception.”  Id.; see also Jonah M. Knobler, Performance 
Anxiety: The Internet and Copyright’s Vanishing Performance/Distribution Distinction, 25 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 531, 568 (2007) (questioning the post-Internet viability of the 
distinction between performing and mechanical rights); W. Jonathan Cardi, Über-
Middleman: Reshaping the Broken Landscape of Music Copyright, 92 IOWA L. REV. 835, 
852–66 (2007) (describing technical differences between digital downloading and 
streaming); Jesse Rendell, Comment, Copyright Law in the New Millennium: Digital 
Downloads and Performance Rights, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 907, 918–26 (2008) (suggesting, 
contrary to ASCAP, that digital downloads may implicate performance rights). 
 If downloading a copy doesn’t trigger performance rights, can the converse be true—
can streaming a performance trigger reproduction rights?  In response to the Second 
Circuit’s ruling, the music publishers asked the Supreme Court to review the Cartoon 
Network case, arguing that the court’s holding on the “buffer copy” issue interfered with 
rulemaking on the issue proceeding under the auspices of the Copyright Office.  See Brief 
of National Music Publishers’ Ass’n, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
10–22, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) (No. 08-
448), 2008 WL 4843618; Compulsory License for Making and Distributing Phonorecords, 
Including Digital Phonorecord Deliveries, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,802, 40,802–13 (July 16, 
2008).  After accepting comments about the Cartoon Network case, the Copyright Office 
determined that the opinion, while not definitive, had caused sufficient uncertainty to 
make it inadvisable to engage in rulemaking activity on the issue of whether buffer copies 
fall within the § 115 compulsory license.  See 73 Fed. Reg. 66,173, 66,173–82 (Nov. 7, 
2008). 
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locker, customers upload their copies to the locker.  The copy is 
stored there and played back on demand from wherever the customer 
is at the time.  In the RS-DVR service, by contrast, the customer 
won’t upload anything to Cablevision.  The copy will be made by 
Cablevision at the customer’s request (perhaps lawfully, if Sony 
applies to this method of time-shifting)81 and retained by Cablevision 
for the customer’s subsequent access.  There won’t be any “upload” 
of a copy, and there won’t be any “download” either.  Instead there 
will be an on-demand, streaming transmission of the performance that 
was preserved in the copy. 
The RS-DVR subscriber therefore will receive performances 
without ever taking possession of a copy, physical or digital.  The 
remotely created copy will be held at a remote location, in trust, so to 
speak.  This contrivance makes one wonder whether there really will 
be a personal copy behind each RS-DVR transmission82 or whether, 
 
81 See supra note 7.  Whether the RS-DVR copies will be lawfully made reproductions 
was the threshold issue in the Cartoon Network case.  See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127–33 (2d Cir. 2008).  The reproduction claim involved 
two sub-issues: first, whether Cablevision will make infringing copies by buffering the 
data from its programming stream in the form of transient copies, id. at 127–30, and 
second, whether Cablevision will make infringing copies by providing the RS-DVR 
service to its subscribers (i.e., whether its copying will be “volitional” or merely automatic 
and involuntary), id. at 130–33. 
82 When RS-DVR was first announced, in fact, some tech-savvy consumers expressed 
their skepticism about whether Cablevision really did plan to save personal copies of 
programs, rather than master copies of its entire broadcast schedule.  “They’re not actaully 
[sic] going to record anything for anybody . . . .  They will record everything once and 
give subscribers the illusion of scheduling their own recordings, when actually all they’ve 
really got is 80 hours worth of program pointers.”  Unverified, Comment to Cablevision to 
Rollout Remote-Storage DVR Service, ENGADGET, Mar. 27, 2006, http://www.engadget 
.com/2006/03/27/cablevision-to-rollout-remote-storage-dvr-service/#comments.  Another 
commenter stated: 
I’m sure that everyone doesn’t actually GET 80 real hours of recording space.  
Maybe starting out, when the user group is small and many disparate shows are 
being recorded (no dupes by any of the users), sure everyone has their own 
partition, but eventually, as the user base grows, while any single user has 
“access to” or a hypothetical 80-hour  storage limit, what would likely be going 
on behind the scenes is stored show sharing. 
Dhodory, Comment to Cablevision to Rollout Remote-Storage DVR Service, ENGADGET, 
Mar. 27, 2006, http://www.engadget.com/2006/03/27/cablevision-to-rollout-remote           
-storage-dvr-service/#comments. 
 Three years later, the Wall Street Journal speculated that the studios might eventually 
agree to allow Cablevision and others to forgo the storage of personal RS-DVR copies—
the very condition upon which the Second Circuit had based its decision in Cartoon 
Network—if Cablevision would put curbs on ad-skipping technology and allow the studios 
to refresh their ads on the programming.  See Vishesh Kumar and Sam Schechner, High 
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to the contrary, the concept of the personal copy serves Cablevision as 
a metaphor that actually signifies a prepaid right of access to 
performances of the work.83  Digital transmissions function by 
sending and receiving sequences of information that may take the 
form of downloaded copies or streaming performances, depending on 
how the data are encoded by the sender and decoded by the receiver.  
In other words, the strings of zeros and ones that compose a digital 
copy are capable of being manipulated by software into either a copy 
or a performance, which is why it makes little difference to users of 
digital copies whether their files are preserved on electromagnetic 
storage devices in their own media players or stored in remote 
computers that they can access at will.  However one describes them, 
these intangible data sequences aren’t, in and of themselves, copies or 
performances, but rather encoded information in digitized form that 
can be decoded into access to works of authorship in the form of 
copies or in the form of performances.84 
Even if the virtual locker analogy fails, however, that doesn’t mean 
the VOD analogy necessarily succeeds.  This is because the question 
remains—the RS-DVR service will transmit a performance of what, a 
TV program (i.e., a “work”) or a copy of one?  The choice is crucial 
because, under Nimmer’s “different times” rationale, serial 
transmissions of performances emanating from the same copy would 
be required for new, and infringing, public performances.85 
Cablevision asserted in its defense that each RS-DVR archived 
copy will be, in fact, different and unique because each will be 
separately created and will be accessible only from the particular 
 
Court Boosts Remote DVR, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at B5, available at 
http://online.wsj .com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB124628574640368173.html#articleTabs 
%3Darticle. 
83 Presumably it would be illegal, under the transmit clause, for Cablevision to simply 
allow subscribers to access its own video collection.  The case of the MP3.com music 
service was a cautionary tale for Cablevision.  The defendant in that case streamed 
performances to its subscribers from a collection of sound recordings that it had purchased 
itself and copied onto its own servers.  UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. 
Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  Even though MP3.com verified that its subscribers 
owned their own copies of these CDs and portrayed its service as the “functional 
equivalent” of storing them for remote access, it was held liable for copyright 
infringement.  Id.  The UMG Recordings court, however, did not address the issue of 
performance rights, but rather held that MP3.com’s copying was done illegally; the 
opinion was principally concerned with whether MP3.com was entitled to a fair use 
defense for making these unauthorized copies.  See id. at 350–53. 
84 See Knobler, supra note 80, at 579–80. 
85 Cablevision Brief, supra note 17. 
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cable box through which it was ordered.86  Therefore, playing RS-
DVR copies will only result in private performances.  In order to 
make Cablevision pay for playing the RS-DVR copies, the studios 
would have to establish that all RS-DVR copies of a program will be 
functionally the same because they will all be copies of the same 
performance of the work, that is, the performance that had been 
transmitted to the public via the original network telecast.  They had 
succeeded in doing so to the satisfaction of Judge Denny Chin in the 
district court,87 but now, in the Second Circuit, they would have to 
convince Judge John M. Walker Jr. and the other two members of the 
appellate panel88 all over again. 
VIII 
“CAPABLE OF RECEIVING THE PERFORMANCE” 
In the Second Circuit, Judge Walker approached the question of 
what Cablevision would be “performing” by splitting his analysis of 
the transmit clause into two questions: what is the source material of 
the transmission, and what is the identity of the transmitter?  “[I]t 
seems quite consistent with the Act,” he wrote, “to treat a 
transmission made using Copy A as distinct from one made using 
Copy B, just as we would treat a transmission made by Cablevision as 
distinct from an otherwise identical transmission made by 
Comcast.”89  He explained that both factors would “limit the potential 
audience of a transmission [and] are therefore germane in determining 
whether that transmission is made ‘to the public.’”90 
Judge Walker’s approach took place against the background of the 
same problem that had worried Professor Nimmer—the open-textured 
language of the transmit clause.  The “separate places/different times” 
provision, taken literally, would mean that any transmission of a 
recorded performance could legally be “public” because the same 
recording of the work—if not the same copy of the recording—could 
be played and transmitted by someone else, to a different place, or at 
 
86 Id. 
87 See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 478 F. Supp. 
2d 607, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
88 Judges Robert D. Sack and Debra Ann Livingston.  Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2008). 
89 Id. at 138. 
90 Id. 
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a different time.91  “Doubtless the potential audience for every 
copyrighted audiovisual work is the general public,” he wrote.92  “As 
a result, any transmission of the content of a copyrighted work would 
constitute a public performance under the district court’s 
interpretation.”93  To preserve the distinction between private and 
public performances, some limitation needed to be inferred, either on 
the “someone else” who is doing the transmitting (i.e., the identity of 
the transmitter) or the “something else” that is being transmitted (i.e., 
the source material of the transmission). 
On the “source material” option, Judge Walker improved on 
Nimmer’s approach to the transmit clause by tying it more closely to 
the language of the statute.  Professor Nimmer had theorized that the 
source material of a transmission would have to be the same copy of a 
recorded performance in order for the “different times” provision to 
take effect.94  Without disagreeing, Judge Walker revisited the 
transmit clause and focused on the phrase—“capable of receiving the 
performance.”95  The text specifies that a public performance occurs 
whenever a performance is transmitted to a place “open to the public” 
or “to the public, by means of any device or process, whether the 
members of the public capable of receiving the performance or 
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the 
same time or at different times.”96 
Cablevision’s position, which was based on Nimmer’s theory, 
dovetailed with this explicit limitation on the transmit clause.  The 
reason only one subscriber will be capable of receiving a particular 
RS-DVR transmission is that each transmission will be “made using a 
single unique copy of a work, made by an individual subscriber, one 
that can be decoded exclusively by that subscriber’s cable box,” wrote 
Judge Walker.97  “This argument accords with the language of the 
transmit clause, which . . . directs us to consider the potential audience 
of a given transmission.”98 
 
91 Id. at 135–36. 
92 Id. at 136–37. 
93 Id. at 136. 
94 See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 24. 
95 See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134. 
96 Id. at 134 (emphasis added) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 definition of public 
performance). 
97 Id. at 135. 
98 Id. 
 2010] The Public Performance Problem in 531 
Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 
This would be a reasonable enough, text-based accommodation 
between what Cablevision proposed to do and what the statute 
prescribed that it could do, except that the solution required Judge 
Walker to focus on the potential audience of a given transmission 
instead of the potential audience of a given performance.99  As noted 
before, a transmission of a performance is a type of performance.100  
Even so, the two words are not interchangeable or reversible.101 
 
99 Id. at 136. 
100 See supra note 19; see also infra text accompanying note 131. 
101 This is how Judge Walker justified substituting “transmission” for “performance”: 
This plain language instructs us that, in determining whether a transmission is “to 
the public,” it is of no moment that the potential recipients of the transmission are 
in different places, or that they may receive the transmission at different times.  
The implication from this same language, however, is that it is relevant, in 
determining whether a transmission is made to the public, to discern who is 
“capable of receiving” the performance being transmitted.  The fact that the 
statute says “capable of receiving the performance,” instead of “capable of 
receiving the transmission,” underscores the fact that a transmission of a 
performance is itself a performance. 
Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134 (emphasis added) (citing Buck v. Jewell-La Salle 
Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 197–98 (1931)).  The problem is with the last sentence.  
Although a transmission is a type of performance, the word “transmission” cannot be 
exchanged for the word “performance,” or vice versa, without changing the meaning of the 
statement.  Otherwise “performing a transmission” and “transmitting a performance” 
would mean the same thing, which they don’t.  The former phrase refers to the act of 
transmitting and the latter to what is transmitted (a performance). 
 In the next paragraph of his opinion, Judge Walker quoted a passage in the legislative 
history: 
[A] performance made available by transmission to the public at large is 
“public” even though the recipients are not gathered in a single place, and even if 
there is no proof that any of the potential recipients was operating his receiving 
apparatus at the time of the transmission.  The same principles apply whenever 
the potential recipients of the transmission represent a limited segment of the 
public, such as the occupants of hotel rooms or the subscribers of a cable 
television service. 
Id. at 135 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64–65 (1996)).  He saw this as additional 
evidence that the phrases “capable of receiving the performance” and “capable of 
receiving the transmission” were intended by Congress to be interchangeable.  See id. at 
136.  What the passage says, however, is that a transmission of a performance to the public 
at large is a public performance even if (1) there is no proof that the transmission was ever 
received by anyone who was capable of receiving it and (2) the “public at large” is in fact 
only a “limited segment” of it, such as hotel guests or cable subscribers. 
 These caveats don’t raise the standard for what qualifies as a public performance, but 
lower it.  The caveats say that the standard could be satisfied by as little as a single 
transmission sent out to—but not necessarily received by—a limited audience of hotel 
guests or cable subscribers.  They don’t imply that the same performance can’t be 
transmitted more than once, and hence received by members of the public at “different 
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The transmit clause specifies that a public performance may be 
based on “the transmission of a performance of a work” (as Judge 
Walker parsed the statute)102 to an audience that is dispersed in 
“separate places” and “different times,” provided that these qualifying 
“members of the public” are all “capable of receiving the 
performance.”103  The statute does not say “capable of receiving the 
transmission.”  Switching the words “performance” and 
“transmission” changed the outcome of the case because there will be 
viewers who will be capable of receiving a performance of a network 
telecast (subscribers to Cablevision’s feed of HBO) but not capable of 
receiving particular transmissions of that performance (non-
subscribers to Cablevision’s RS-DVR service).  This is because non-
subscribers won’t have access to any RS-DVR copies, and even RS-
DVR subscribers will have access only to their own copies. 
IX 
HOW FAR UPSTREAM? 
Hence, the studios had put their emphasis on the word 
“performance” rather than “transmission” and argued that 
[t]he critical factor, under the Transmit Clause, is that the same 
performance is transmitted to different subscribers at different 
times.  Because Cablevision (as part of the authorized real-time 
stream and as part of the unauthorized on-demand stream) would 
transmit from its head-end to its subscribers’ homes the same 
performance, Cablevision would engage in a public performance of 
that program.104 
Judge Walker, however, found that the words “performance” and 
“transmission” could not be pried apart so easily.105 
He focused his concern about the perplexing couplet—
performance/transmission—on language from the same page of the 
studios’ brief, from which he pieced together the following sentence: 
“The critical factor . . . is that the same performance is transmitted to 
 
times,” much less that transmitting encrypted rebroadcasts of copyrighted programming to 
individual cable boxes has the effect of converting what were once public performances 
into private ones. 
102 Id. at 134 (“Accordingly, we ask whether these facts satisfy the second, ‘transmit 
clause’ of the public performance definition: Does Cablevision ‘transmit . . . a 
performance . . . of the work . . . to the public’?” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101)). 
103 Id. 
104 Fox Brief, supra note 16, at 27. 
105 See id. 
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different subscribers at different times . . . . more specifically, the 
performance of that program by HBO or another programming 
service.”106  He understood the last clause to concede that the true 
source of Cablevision’s performance was HBO’s transmission of its 
programming to Cablevision, rather than Cablevision’s retransmission 
to its subscribers.107  The source of a broadcast, in other words, is 
always the content provider (in this case, HBO) rather than any of the 
cable companies that distribute the content concurrently through their 
regional networks (in this case Cablevision).108 
If this is so, he wondered, why doesn’t the transmit clause require 
the court to consider not only the audience of Cablevision’s real-time 
transmission but also the potential audience of any transmission by 
anyone of the underlying HBO feed?109 
Assume that HBO transmits a copyrighted work to both Cablevision 
and Comcast.  Cablevision merely retransmits the work from one 
Cablevision facility to another, while Comcast retransmits the 
program to its subscribers.  Under plaintiffs’ interpretation, 
Cablevision would still be transmitting the performance to the 
public, solely because Comcast has transmitted the same underlying 
performance to the public.  Similarly, a hapless customer who 
records a program in his den and later transmits the recording to a 
television in his bedroom would be liable for publicly performing 
the work simply because some other party had once transmitted the 
same underlying performance to the public.110 
Without a limiting principle, there is no way to determine where a 
chain of transmissions begins and ends, and therefore there is no way 
of knowing whether a performance is public or private.111  In a word, 
he asked, how far “upstream” should one go to find the source of a 
transmission?112  That question is crucial under the transmit clause 
because everything “downstream” from the source might be 
considered part of the same performance.113 
 
106 Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 136 (alterations in original) (quoting Fox Brief, supra 
note 16, at 27); see also supra text accompanying note 79. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 Id. 
111 See id. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. (“[W]e believe it would be inconsistent with our own transmit clause 
jurisprudence to consider the potential audience of an upstream transmission by a third 
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The limiting principle that solved the problem for Judge Walker 
was to specify the identity of the transmitter.114  This would allow the 
chain of transmissions and retransmissions to be framed into discrete 
segments, and liability to be allocated accordingly.115 
Although the transmit clause is not a model of clarity, we believe 
that when Congress speaks of transmitting a performance to the 
public, it refers to the performance created by the act of 
transmission.  Thus, HBO transmits its own performance of a work 
when it transmits to Cablevision, and Cablevision transmits its own 
performance of the same work when it retransmits the feed from 
HBO.116 
This approach had the virtue of accommodating the positions of 
both parties in the case.  The virtue, however, was a dubious one 
because it was agnostic as to how the case should be decided.  The 
only way Judge Walker’s digression on the “identity of the 
transmitter” would alter the outcome of the case would be if it were 
coupled with a finding that the transmitter will be someone other than 
Cablevision itself, namely, Cablevision’s RS-DVR subscribers.  
Then, one could logically conclude that the RS-DVR subscribers will 
be transmitting their own performances of Cablevision’s 
 
party when determining whether a defendant’s own subsequent transmission of a 
performance is ‘to the public.’”). 
 The “transmit clause jurisprudence” to which Judge Walker referred was the Second 
Circuit’s decision in National Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture (NFL), 211 
F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000).  Id.  NFL dealt with a satellite uplink of a U.S. broadcast that was 
then downlinked, without permission, to TV viewers in Canada.  Id. at 11.  The court held 
that the U.S.-based uplink was an infringing public performance, even though the 
Canadian downlink wasn’t, because it was “a step in the process by which NFL’s 
protected work wends its way to a public audience.”  Id. at 13.  This rationale bootstrapped 
a finding of infringement in the United States on a non-infringing performance in Canada, 
based on the happenstance that the Canadian broadcast was preceded by the U.S.-based 
uplink.  See id.  NFL was criticized by Nimmer’s treatise, which pointed out that the public 
performance in Canada did not “derogate[] from U.S. copyright interests” and therefore 
“eventuated in non-actionable conduct as far as U.S. copyright law is concerned.”  See 2 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 24, at § 8.14[C][2]. 
 In any event, the upstream/downstream distinction that Judge Walker derived from NFL 
didn’t support his conclusion that Cablevision won’t be liable for the unauthorized 
transmissions made through its RS-DVR service.  See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 137.  
This is because all RS-DVR transmissions will be “downstream” from Cablevision’s real-
time telecasts, which are undoubtedly public performances.  Id.  In addition, Cablevision’s 
RS-DVR transmissions won’t be made by unrelated third parties, but, on its own account, 
by Cablevision’s own subscribers availing themselves of facilities and equipment provided 
by Cablevision.  See id. 
114 See Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 137. 
115 Id. at 136. 
116 Id. 
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programming back to themselves.  Such retransmissions could be 
considered non-infringing private performances because a 
transmission to oneself is not directed “to the public.”117  Judge 
Walker, however, expressly declined to decide the issue of who will 
be doing the transmitting.  Instead he took the “arguendo” path of 
assuming that “even if . . . Cablevision makes the transmission when 
an RS-DVR playback occurs, we find that the RS-DVR playback, as 
described here, does not involve the transmission of a performance ‘to 
the public.’”118 
The studios, therefore, could afford to concede that each party is 
responsible for its own transmissions.  Cablevision isn’t responsible 
for unauthorized uses of HBO’s feed by Comcast or some other cable 
network; and if that unauthorized use ever occurs, the studios won’t 
complain to Cablevision.  However, isn’t Cablevision still responsible 
for its own unauthorized uses of HBO’s feed?  If so, the question of 
whether Cablevision’s RS-DVR transmissions will be permissible 
private performances or unauthorized public ones remained 
unanswered. 
X 
A PERFORMANCE OF A COPY OF A WORK 
In order to place a limit on liability for “upstream” transmissions 
by legal strangers, Judge Walker inferred that the transmit clause 
requires a new performance to begin each time the identity of the 
transmitter changes.119  Cablevision, therefore, is responsible only for 
transmissions that occur “downstream” from its initial, real-time 
transmission.120  This is a sensible way to think about what happens 
legally when broadcasts ripple across multiple networks, but it 
doesn’t explain the result in Cartoon Network because all 
transmissions through Cablevision’s RS-DVR service will be 
downstream from its real-time transmissions.  Therefore, shielding 
Cablevision from liability for upstream transmissions by legal 
strangers doesn’t shield Cablevision from liability for its own 
 
117 Of course, transmissions of Cablevision’s programming from its subscribers back to 
themselves would be “downstream” from the initial network telecasts, and these 
subscribers are hardly “legal strangers.” 
118 Id. at 134 (emphasis added).  Why didn’t the court try to answer the question of who 
will be the transmitter?  See supra note 19. 
119 See id. at 136. 
120 Id. 
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downstream transmissions.  If the upstream/downstream distinction 
was a red herring, what was the true ratio decidendi? 
Judge Walker based his holding on what he thought was the key 
fact in the case—that only one subscriber (the one who ordered the 
RS-DVR copy) will be capable of receiving each RS-DVR 
transmission because only that subscriber will have access to it.121  
This, he concluded, makes each RS-DVR transmission a private 
rather than a public performance.122  The studios, in contrast, had 
focused on what they thought was the key fact in the case—that all 
RS-DVR copies will be copied from Cablevision’s live programming 
feed.  This, they claimed, will make all RS-DVR transmissions into 
time-delayed public performances of those network telecasts rather 
than private performances of original source material.123 
The reason that the studios were right and Judge Walker was 
wrong was that he derived his conclusion from a misreading of the 
statute.  As noted before, the transmit clause specifies that “members 
of the public” must be “capable of receiving the performance,” not 
“capable of receiving the transmission.”124  Judge Walker thought 
that the words “performance” and “transmission” were 
interchangeable in this context because the statute imposes liability on 
anyone who transmits an unauthorized performance to the public.125  
But even though the transmit clause refers, as Judge Walker put it, to 
“the performance created by the act of transmission,”126 a 
transmission and a performance remain, technically and legally, two 
distinct things.  The difference between them is that a transmission is 
the medium through which a performance is delivered “to the 
public.”127  This is why there may be more than one transmission of 
the same performance, that is, why members of the public may 
receive a public performance at “different times.” 
To put this difference in the form of an example, the transmit 
clause says that, when HBO transmits its live programming feed of 
The Sopranos to Cablevision, it is performing The Sopranos.  When 
Cablevision relays the HBO feed to its subscribers in real time, it is 
 
121 Id. at 137–38. 
122 Id. at 139. 
123 Id. at 136. 
124 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
125 Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 134. 
126 Id. at 136. 
127 See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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doing the same thing—performing The Sopranos.  In both instances, 
the performance of The Sopranos is what the transmission transmits.  
To say, as Judge Walker did, that a performance is created by the act 
of transmission128 is a compressed way of saying that the transmitter 
is legally responsible for compensating the copyright owner for this 
particular rendering of the work (i.e., the use protected by the 
performance right).  A transmission, a lawyer can say, is 
constructively a legal performance, and the transmitter is 
constructively a performer.  But this interpretation doesn’t make it 
literally so. 
When trying to assess the scope of the transmit clause, it helps to 
bear in mind that Congress in 1976 inherited the legal fictions that 
were woven into the preexisting body of judge-created doctrine 
dealing with performance rights.  As a whole, the trend of copyright 
policy throughout the twentieth century was to expand the 
performance right to encompass technological innovations that would 
allow works to be experienced in remote locations and by dispersed 
audiences.129  These new technologies were anticipated and 
acknowledged in the 1976 Act by the open-textured language of the 
“separate places/different times” provision. 
The first legal fiction is that of the “mechanical copy,” which 
maintains that activating a recording of a work on a mechanical or 
electronic playback device is a performance of the work as well as a 
performance of the recording (i.e., the copy).130  This means that 
playing a recording of a performance in public is a public 
performance.  This legal fiction expanded the performance right to 
 
128 Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 136. 
129 See, e.g., Stadler, supra note 11, at 727–28. 
130 This legal fiction dates back to the legislative response to White-Smith Music 
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).  The court in White-Smith held that piano 
rolls (“mechanical copies”) of musical compositions were not legally copies of musical 
works because they weren’t legible to human musicians, but only readable by mechanical 
devices (i.e., player pianos).  Id. at 17.  Therefore, the unauthorized publication of the 
piano rolls did not violate the copyright held by the authors of the sheet music.  Id. at 18. 
 In section 1(e) of the 1909 Act, Congress worked around White-Smith by providing a 
compulsory license for recordings of performances of musical compositions (known as the 
“mechanical license”).  Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (present-day compulsory license provision for 
making and distributing phonorecords).  Although the ghost of White-Smith lingers in the 
1976 Act’s distinction between “copies” and “phonorecords,” the current statute, in its § 
101 definition of “to ‘perform,’” expressly recognizes that the authors of musical 
compositions are entitled to performance rights for the public rendition of such recordings 
(viz., rendition “by means of any device or process”).  17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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include public renditions of recorded performances, such as showing 
a movie in a theater or playing a phonorecord in a retail store or 
restaurant. 
The second legal fiction is the multiple performance doctrine, 
which maintains that an electronic transmission of a performance, 
such as showing a movie on TV or playing a phonorecord over the 
radio, is itself a performance, both on the part of the transmitter and 
the receiver.131  Although receiving a radio broadcast is something 
more than “listening to a distant rendition of the same program,”132 it 
is still something much less than a human performance from a script 
or score, or even a mechanical performance from a copy or 
phonorecord.  What the metaphor of “transmission as performance” 
means is that electronic transmitters are responsible for compensating 
the owner of the work’s performance rights as if they have actually 
performed the work or a copy of it. 
This legal fiction is miles away from any layperson’s notion of 
what a performer or a transmitter does, but it makes sense on its own 
terms in the legal context of defining what a public performance is.  
As such, it sets out the boundaries of the performance right but 
without reducing performances and transmissions to the same literal 
thing.  Performances are ways of realizing works in perceptible form, 
that is, of transforming the author’s intangible expression into sounds 
and images that will be perceptible to an audience.  Transmissions, in 
contrast, are a mode of distribution rather than one of embodiment. 
These two legal fictions reflect how broadcast technologies work—
copies embody performances, and transmissions communicate them 
to the public.  Indeed, Judge Walker took the trouble to note that 
performances of audiovisual works cannot be transmitted at all unless 
the transmitter has obtained copies of them.133  This is why the 
question he asked of whether Cablevision will transmit a performance 
of a work to the public134 implicitly contained the more pointed one 
of whether Cablevision will transmit a performance of a copy of a 
 
131 See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 197–98 (1931). 
132 Id. at 199.  “We are satisfied that the reception of a radio broadcast and its 
translation into audible sound is not a mere audition of the original program.  It is 
essentially a reproduction.”  Id. at 199–200.  A better word would have been “rendition” 
because “reproduction” in copyright parlance implies the creation of a copy. 
133 Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 137–38 (“[N]o transmission of an audiovisual work 
can be made, we assume, without using a copy of that work: to transmit a performance of a 
movie, for example, the transmitter generally must obtain a copy of that movie.”). 
134 See supra note 102. 
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work to the public.135  It is reasonable and perhaps necessary for 
anyone trying to parse the transmit clause to infer that the technology 
of broadcasting requires the word “copy” to be read into it.  This 
inference, however, also leads to confusion about what is being 
“performed” in these transmissions. 
The confusion was reflected in the dispute over the RS-DVR 
service in Cartoon Network.  Cablevision claimed that two different 
performances, both legally “private,” would result from two different 
RS-DVR transmissions, as long as the two transmissions emanated 
from two distinct copies.136  The studios responded, however, that 
those two copies would be copies of exactly the same thing—the 
public performance of the work that had been transmitted to the 
public by the initial network telecast.137  The perplexing problem 
posed by the Cartoon Network case was what the legal status of the 
RS-DVR performances should be.  The solution, to the Second 
Circuit in 2008, as to the Supreme Court in 1908, appeared to depend 
on what is meant by the word “copy.”138 
XI 
“WHAT IS MEANT BY A COPY?” 
In legal arguments, the same facts often have a different 
significance depending on how they are framed in relation to each 
other.  Context determines how the facts cohere, what they mean, and, 
 
135 This may also be why Judge Walker was so receptive to Professor Nimmer’s “same 
copy” theory of the “different times” provision.  He commented that “[u]nfortunately, 
neither the Redd Horne court nor Prof. Nimmer explicitly explains why the use of a 
distinct copy affects the transmit clause inquiry” and offered his own explanation that “the 
use of a unique copy may limit the potential audience of a transmission.”  Cartoon 
Network, 536 F.3d at 138. 
136 Id. at 135. 
137 Id. at 136. 
138 The question is quoted from the White-Smith case, in which the Supreme Court 
wrestled unsuccessfully with a puzzling new entity—mechanical copies of performances, 
or what falls within the category of work that the statute now defines as “sound 
recordings.”  See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908). 
It may be true that in a broad sense a mechanical instrument which reproduces a 
tune copies it; but this is a strained and artificial meaning.  . . .  In no sense can 
musical sounds which reach us through the sense of hearing be said to be copies, 
as that term is generally understood, and as we believe it was intended to be 
understood in the statutes under consideration. 
Id. 
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in the most basic sense, what they are.139  The challenge that 
confronted the Cartoon Network court was to determine what would 
be transmitted when a recorded TV program is streamed through the 
network to an individual RS-DVR subscriber’s cable box. 
The same legal entity, the copy of a performance, can be viewed in 
two different ways, depending on the context in which it was created.  
The Second Circuit endorsed the position that Cablevision will be 
transmitting—that is, streaming a performance of—a unique copy of a 
TV program for the first time.  This in-home performance of a copy 
for one viewer will be legally “private.”140  However, the court could 
just as plausibly have decided that Cablevision will be retransmitting 
a network telecast of the TV program, by whatever technical means, 
for the “nth” time.  This performance would have to be defined 
legally as “public.”  We can put these two alternatives in question 
form.  Does each copy of a network telecast have a distinct legal 
identity?  Or are all copies of the telecast identical instances of the 
same copied thing?  It’s a question of drawing brackets around the 
copy and saying that the copy is unique because it was made to order 
for a particular subscriber (a narrow framing of the copy), or that it is 
not unique because it shares a common origin with copies made for 
other subscribers (a broader framing of the copy).141 
If all copies of a telecast are copies of the same performance, then 
the streaming of a performance of any single copy through the 
network to an individual viewer’s cable box should be deemed a 
public one.  This is because, under the transmit clause, the multiple 
transmissions of that recorded performance from a central facility, to 
viewers who are dispersed in location and time, must be viewed 
together as one cumulative act of performance (a performance 
occurring at “different times” and in “separate places”).  If, on the 
other hand, each copy of a telecast is unique, then any performance of 
that unique copy will be distinct from any performance of any other 
unique copy, and all such performances will be private, even if they 
are transmitted from one place to another, as long as they occur in 
 
139 See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 
STAN. L. REV. 591, 593–96 (1981) (summarizing interpretive frameworks). 
140 Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139. 
141 The “performance” embodied in the copy likewise could be narrowly or broadly 
framed.  A narrow framing would view each transmission to an individual viewer as a 
separate and distinct performance, while a broader framing would view these multiple 
transmissions as the same performance received by “members of the public” at “different 
times.” 
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private, that is, at home, for a single viewer or a family circle of 
viewers.142 
This type of legal fact framing—constructing a fact to become one 
thing or another depending on how widely one specifies its context—
is a familiar maneuver to lawyers, who know that the choice in 
persuasive writing between partisan constructions usually isn’t based 
on the intrinsic superiority of one construction over the other, but 
rather on independent grounds of legal principle, authority, or policy.  
The more basic question in the Cartoon Network case was why 
everyone involved seemed obliged to accept the premise that the 
nature of the RS-DVR copy—whether it will be original and unique 
or non-original and duplicative—will determine whether a 
performance of that copy by way of transmission over Cablevision’s 
network will be a private or a public one. 
As a case of statutory construction, Cartoon Network revolved 
around the meaning of the “separate places/different times” provision.  
The meaning of this provision, however, is complicated by the legal 
fictions of the mechanical copy and the multiple performance 
doctrine.  In addition, Professor Melville Nimmer’s preeminent 
copyright treatise proposed a theory of the transmit clause—the 
“same copy” theory—that has served as the template for over thirty 
years of transmit clause jurisprudence.  These circumstances may 
have obscured the more important question that needed to be asked 
about the transmit clause. 
Whether one agrees with the policy or not,143 Congress enacted the 
transmit clause to make the performance right as broad as possible, as 
reflected in the open-ended phrase “by means of any device or 
process.”144  The transmit clause mandates that a transmission of a 
performance “to the public” is legally a public one even if the 
performance is received by the public in separate places and at 
different times.  It is far from clear, however, how the drafters of the 
statute expected these serial and piecemeal public performances to 
come about.  To what advance in broadcasting technology was 
Congress responding when it provided that a public performance 
 
142 What would make a performance “private” can be inferred from what would make it 
“public”: “to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a 
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social 
acquaintances are gathered.”  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining public performance). 
143 See, e.g., Stadler, supra note 11, at 718–28 (critiquing the policy). 
144 See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
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could be received in separate places and at different times?  Surely it 
wasn’t the specter of Maxwell’s Video Showcase franchised 
nationwide. 
XII 
INTERACTIVE SERVICES AND DIGITAL COPIES 
What seemed to have been overlooked in the heated argument over 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR copies was that legal performance rights don’t 
require the copyright owner to maintain control of tangible copies, 
regardless of whether the copies take physical or digital form.145  
When an author parts with a copy, of whatever type, even one that 
came into being under the principle of fair use, he or she is not 
conveying the right to stage public performances of the work.146  To 
put this more directly, when HBO provides a copy of The Sopranos to 
Cablevision, the copy alone does not give Cablevision the right to 
perform the program publicly, that is, to broadcast it.  The public 
performance of The Sopranos depends on the terms of Cablevision’s 
license.  If Cablevision pays for the right to play the program one time 
over its network, then that is all it may do.  It may not rebroadcast the 
performance for its subscribers, either through another real-time 
network telecast or through a series of individually ordered 
transmissions (e.g., video on demand). 
In an attempt to explain the transmit clause’s enigmatic “different 
times” provision, Professor Nimmer proposed the “same copy” 
theory, a theory that was creative in its time and, in due course, 
illustrated in real life by the Redd Horne case.147  In Redd Horne, the 
same copy of a videotape was repeatedly transmitted from a central 
bank of VCRs to private viewing booths.148  These showings were 
deemed to be public performances because serial viewings of the 
same private performance amounted to a time-extended public one.149  
 
145 Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy 
Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1283 (2001) (“The public performance and 
display rights . . . account for a separate model of economic exploitation of a copyrighted 
work, a model that is in no way dependent upon the idea of a physical copy or the notion 
of fixation.”). 
146 The “first sale” doctrine applies only to distribution rights, not to performance rights 
or any others.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
147 Or at least by its dicta.  See supra text accompanying notes 33–43. 
148 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 156–57 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
149 Id. at 162. 
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Redd Horne was an oddity, however, because the contrivance of the 
video store’s arrangement was devised to compensate for the scarcity 
and expense of VCRs, and it is difficult to imagine how that situation 
would ever recur.  The “same copy” theory applied in Redd Horne 
can’t possibly be an adequate response to the technological 
developments that Congress was anticipating.150  At best, Redd Horne 
lives on as an example of how the “different times” provision was 
applied in the early 1980s. 
On the other hand, the 1967 legislative history quoted in the On 
Command Video case—“sounds or images stored in an information 
system and capable of being performed or displayed at the initiative 
of individual members of the public”151—provides a very good hint 
of what Congress was likely concerned about, although it didn’t have 
a name for it at the time.  It is more than likely that Congress intended 
the transmit clause to extend performance rights to the “celestial 
jukebox” or what subsequently became known to Congress, in the 
context of digital sound recordings, as “interactive services” through 
which subscribers at “different times” could order performances for 
delivery to their radios or computers—a type of service, in the context 
of movies and TV programs, that would put VOD and RS-DVR under 
the same interactive umbrella.152  Indeed, any other interpretation of 
 
150 See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(distinguishing Redd Horne). 
151 Id. at 135.  See supra text accompanying note 61.  Professor Patry commented that 
the only notable change made by the statutory language that this report explains was to the 
definition of public performance, which expanded the definition to include the “separate 
places/different times” provision.  “With the exception of a minor amendment to the 
definition of ‘to perform a work ‘publicly’ in 1974, the 1966 House Judiciary Committee 
bill's language on Section 106(4) and the relevant definitions in Section 101 were adopted 
in the 1976 Act.”  4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 14:16 (2010). 
152 Congress first defined “interactive service” in the Digital Performance Right in 
Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995), and broadened 
that definition three years later in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. 
No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
An “interactive service” is one that enables a member of the public to receive a 
transmission of a program specially created for the recipient, or on request, a 
transmission of a particular sound recording, whether or not as part of a program, 
which is selected by or on behalf of the recipient. 
17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7) (2006); see also Steven M. Marks, Entering the Sound Recording 
Performance Right Labyrinth: Defining Interactive Services and the Broadcast Exemption, 
20 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 309, 313–20 (2000) (arguing that any programming of sound 
recordings that is customized for an individual listener falls under the DMCA definition of 
“interactive service”). 
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“separate places/different times” would set up a conflict between the 
transmit clause and the licensing scheme that Congress mapped out in 
the 1990s for interactive services or, at the very least, encourage 
interactive services to develop “copy then send” systems tailored to fit 
the Second Circuit’s newly narrowed definition of public 
performance.153  On the other hand, an understanding that “separate 
places/different times” refers to interactive media would square the 
U.S. public performance right with the “Right of Communication to 
the Public” as defined in the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996.154 
If all of this is true, then instead of focusing on the question of 
whether an RS-DVR performance will emanate from a single copy, 
like video on demand, or from multiple copies, like audio files stored 
in virtual lockers, the Cartoon Network court should have asked what 
type of access to the work the RS-DVR service will provide 
subscribers—one that will give access to the performance of a 
program at a time of their choice (i.e., an interactive service) or one 
that will give access only when a performance had been previously 
scheduled (i.e., a noninteractive service).  By upgrading their cable 
subscriptions from real-time programming to the RS-DVR service, 
Cablevision’s subscribers will be getting the option of exchanging a 
noninteractive viewing experience for an interactive one. 
An interactive service is analogous to what a customer buys with 
the purchase of a copy of a recorded performance, while a 
noninteractive service corresponds to what the customer buys with a 
ticket to a live performance.  When one buys a copy of a 
performance, one can access the performance through the copy 
 
153 Anticipating this criticism, the Second Circuit suggested that such “copy then send” 
systems might be curbed if copyright owners assert their reproduction rights in lieu of 
performance rights.  Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 139–40.  The owner of a work’s 
performance rights, however, might not also own the work’s reproduction rights because 
the rights are divisible.  In addition, a composer who relies on performing rights societies, 
such as ASCAP or Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), to collect performance royalties might 
not have the means or the ability to enforce a claim for unlawful copying or contributory 
infringement. 
154 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty, art. 8, Dec. 20, 
1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 152, 155, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS 
/Volume%202186/v2186.pdf. 
[A]uthors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of 
authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless 
means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way 
that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. 
Id. (emphasis added)). 
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whenever one wants to, but when one buys a ticket to a performance, 
one can access the performance only when it is ready to be staged.  
Copies, in other words, are to interactivity as performances are to 
noninteractivity.  Indeed, it can be argued that the doctrinal distinction 
between copies and performances was really all along “just a proxy 
for the actual distinction that was (and still is) economically and 
conceptually central to copyright law,” as Jonah Knobler put it, “the 
distinction between interactive and non-interactive communication of 
works, or in other words, between access at will and the mere passive, 
happenstance experiencing of works.”155 
Professor Sara K. Stadler observed that tangible copies provide 
consumers with the “freedom . . . to experience a work unlimited 
times,”156 which is why she alleged that copyright owners have 
gravitated toward business models based on performance rights 
instead of reproduction and distribution rights: 
Perhaps the most significant way in which the performance right 
imposes costs on society . . . is by encouraging copyright owners to 
provide the public with experiences without also providing the 
public with tangible copies . . . .  Whither physical copies?  
Suddenly, the name of the game is evanescence: if consumers 
cannot possess a copyrighted work, then rightsholders can charge 
consumers a royalty each time consumers experience it.157 
In the Cartoon Network case, the studios would have prevailed if the 
court had recognized that the copies that RS-DVR creates would be 
short lived byproducts of a process for transmitting public 
performances at “different times,”158 rather than true personal copies 
 
155 Knobler, supra note 80, at 589–90. 
156 Stadler, supra note 11, at 736. 
157 Id. at 735; cf. JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS: THE NEW CULTURE OF 
HYPERCAPITALISM, WHERE ALL OF LIFE IS A PAID-FOR EXPERIENCE 3–136 (2000) 
(critiquing social and economic trends).  Professor Ginsburg offered a more positive view: 
Access controls make it possible for authors to offer end-users a variety of 
distinctly-priced options for enjoyment of copyrighted works.  Were delivery of 
works not secured, novel forms of distribution would be discouraged, and end-
users would continue to be charged for all uses, whatever the level in fact of their 
consumption. 
Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development of an 
Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 113, 124–25 (2003). 
158 Judge Walker’s substitution of “transmission” for “performance” in his reading of 
the transmit clause caused the Solicitor General to worry that the Second Circuit might be 
jeopardizing the protected status of VOD and other interactive services: 
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held in storage for safekeeping.  In fact, there will be nothing 
permanent or personal about the RS-DVR copies because subscribers 
will lose them when they run out of disk space or when they let their 
subscriptions lapse.  Their access to the RS-DVR copies, supposedly 
theirs, lasts only as long as they continue to pay Cablevision’s 
subscription fee.  As I suggested earlier, the reason the arguments 
over performance rights focused on the concept of the copy, when 
there were really no copies in sight,159 is that the copy has become a 
metaphor for what interactivity provides: on-demand access to 
experiences of works of authorship.  This is why Nimmer’s “same 
copy” theory remains so persuasive to judges and lawyers, even 
though it has little relevance to transmissions of digitally recorded 
performances.160 
 
Some language in the court of appeals’ opinion could be read to suggest that a 
performance is not made available “to the public” unless more than one person is 
capable of receiving a particular transmission . . . .  Such a construction could 
threaten to undermine copyright protection in circumstances far beyond those 
presented here, including with respect to VOD services or situations in which a 
party streams copyrighted material on an individualized basis over the Internet. 
S.G. Brief, supra note 8, at 20–21.  Despite this concern, the Solicitor General told the 
Supreme Court that Judge Walker’s reasoning didn’t necessarily apply to VOD because, 
unlike VOD, each RS-DVR transmission will be made using a distinct copy and 
transmitted only to the subscriber who ordered that copy.  Id. at 21.  This assurance, of 
course, is only comforting if one accepts Cablevision’s position on the public performance 
issue in its entirety. 
159 The concept of the copy is of questionable relevance even to video on demand 
because it is difficult to say how many copies Cablevision maintains of its VOD 
programming.  It may have many digital copies of each VOD program, or it may have 
nothing that could be identified as a single, discrete copy.  This is because the VOD 
system works by dividing a digital copy into tiny segments and distributing the segments 
over different servers so that multiple transmissions of performances can be made 
simultaneously.  See Susan Karlin, How It Works; Video on Demand Is Ready, but the 
Market Is Not, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/10 
/technology/how-it-works-video-on-demand-is-ready-but-the-market-is-not.html.  As for 
Cablevision’s linear broadcast schedule, presumably Cablevision could relay an HBO 
transmission through its network without making any copies of the programming stream, 
as was done by the old-fashioned cable TV systems in the Fortnightly and Teleprompter 
cases.  See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 392 (1968); 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 399–404 (1974). 
160 There may be an additional, policy-based reason why the “same copy” theory 
provides an intuitively attractive explanation of the transmit clause.  The limitation on the 
distribution right known as the first sale doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006), allows 
brick-and-mortar video stores like Blockbusters to rent out the same copy of a DVD over 
and over again without paying any fee to the copyright holder, see supra text 
accompanying note 31.  Nevertheless, these video stores are obliged to purchase a 
substantial number of copies of each title because each DVD can be rented by only one 
customer at a time and can be viewed only until it becomes too shopworn to play.  So their 
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XIII 
“VIRTUAL” TIME-SHIFTING AS FAIR USE? 
What made Cablevision’s defense compelling was that its RS-DVR 
will not only fulfill the same purpose as Sony’s Betamax did but that 
it will do so in the same way, by saving individual copies of TV 
programs.  Even though RS-DVR will be a service and Betamax was 
a device, Cablevision’s remote storage service and the set-top storage 
devices it already rents to its customers will be, functionally, much 
the same thing.  Betamax allowed purchasers of the machine to “time-
shift” their TV programs by literally making videotape copies of 
them; RS-DVR will allow subscribers to reserve viewing time by 
signaling to Cablevision in advance that they intend to “time-shift” a 
particular program. 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR subscribers will never take possession of 
physical copies of their programs, but from the viewpoint of 
functionality, the process by which their time-shifting is 
accomplished is unimportant.  If Betamax was a device for time-
shifting, RS-DVR might be described as a service for “virtual” time-
shifting.  Because they do the same thing and their effect on the 
market will, in all probability, be much the same, it might seem to be 
elevating form over substance to disagree with the assertion that 
“virtual time-shifting is time-shifting too.”  This is because it 
shouldn’t matter to copyright owners whether personal copies of TV 
programs—programs that have already been aired in real time over 
the broadcast network—are stored by Cablevision at a remote 
location or stored by its subscribers on their set-top DVRs, or, for that 
matter, stored anywhere at all.  Whether the copies are virtual or 
real—who cares if they serve the same purpose?  It sounds like a 
classic distinction without a difference. 
The way to approach this objection is to recognize that it has 
nothing to do with the question of whether the RS-DVR service will 
transmit private or public performances.  The objection, in essence, is 
 
business model is actually based on the performance of multiple rather than singular 
copies (albeit not as many as if they were selling the copies rather than renting them).  In 
contrast, video streaming services do not have to replenish their copies because they have 
the capacity to rent out the same digital copy concurrently to an indefinite number of VOD 
customers, and their digital copies never wear out.  The “separate places/different times” 
provision in the transmit clause might be said to level the playing field between physical 
and VOD rentals by tacking a virtual public lending right on to the public performance 
right. 
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that, however one characterizes the RS-DVR service or proposes to 
answer the legal questions it evokes,161 what RS-DVR accomplishes 
should be found permissible as long as it does no harm to the 
legitimate interests of the copyright owners.  The lens through which 
this objection must be viewed is that of fair use. 
The Solicitor General was correct that Cablevision’s decision to 
forgo a fair use defense left a gap in the record that detracted from 
Cartoon Network’s value as a bellwether case.  (Of course, 
Cablevision’s decision was strategically correct because it prevailed 
without using the defense.)  In any event, reserving judgment on 
whether the Solicitor General’s advice to the Supreme Court was 
sound, I’d like to conclude by briefly considering what filling this gap 
would entail. 
In policy terms, the question would be whether the consumer’s fair 
use becomes the service provider’s unfair use when a copying service 
is undertaken for profit by a commercial enterprise.  Doctrinally, the 
question would be whether the decision of the Sixth Circuit in 
Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc.162 
was correct and, if so, whether it should be extended from the 
educational photocopying context to the entertainment time-shifting 
one.  As I pointed out earlier, Cablevision’s RS-DVR subscribers 
won’t be uploading their own lawfully obtained copies of TV 
programs to Cablevision’s servers, as they would be if Cablevision 
were maintaining a “virtual locker” for remote access, nor will 
Cablevision be downloading personal copies of TV programs to the 
cable boxes of its subscribers, as it would be if Cablevision were 
maintaining a straightforward copying service.  Instead Cablevision 
will be streaming performances that emanate from custom-made 
copies of real-time programming that were ordered by, but never 
physically or electronically delivered to, its subscribers.  This is why I 
have been arguing that the provenance of the copy obscured the key 
fact on which the decision should have been based—that 
Cablevision’s service will be interactive rather than noninteractive. 
It would be easy enough, though, to suggest to Cablevision that 
instead of transmitting performances to its subscribers’ cable boxes, it 
should redesign its service to deliver copies.  With this change, the 
 
161 Whether Cablevision’s RS-DVR will infringe the studios’ reproduction or 
performance rights and, for the performance rights, whether the unauthorized 
performances will be public or private. 
162 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 
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fair use defense to direct infringement, as stated by the three 
dissenting opinions in Michigan Document, would be front and 
center. 
In Michigan Document, a sharply divided Sixth Circuit held that a 
commercial copyshop, which created custom-made “coursepacks” by 
photocopying excerpts from textbooks and scholarly works, was not 
entitled to a fair use defense.163  The copyshop, which apparently had 
few qualms about directly infringing the publishers’ copyrights,164 
argued that, had the copying been done by the students themselves on 
machines provided by the store, the students presumably would have 
been entitled to a fair use defense.165  Why shouldn’t the copyshop 
stand in the shoes of its customers when it is acting on their behalf?166  
The copyshop didn’t select the copied material (the instructor did 
that), and its “fee for reproducing [a page of] copyrighted materials 
[was] the same as [its] fee for a blank page.”167  The copyshop was 
only enabling the students to do more efficiently what they were 
entitled to do for themselves.  As Judge Merritt put it in his dissent, 
“[t]here is no reason why in this instance the law should discourage 
high schools, colleges, students and professors from hiring the labor 
of others to make their copies any more than there is a reason to 
discourage lawyers from hiring paralegals to make copies for [their] 
clients and courts.”168 
The analogous point here would be that TV viewers, who are 
already allowed to copy TV programs on their set-top DVRs and 
VCRs, should be allowed to make their copies instead on network-
based remote storage systems if that technology is more convenient 
 
163 See id. at 1389. 
164 See id. at 1384 (“Mr. Smith has been something of a crusader against the system 
under which his competitors have been paying agreed royalties, or ‘permission fees’ as 
they are known in the trade.”). 
165 Id. at 1400 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (“The question that must ultimately be answered is 
whether that which is a fair use for a student—copying—is not a fair use if done for the 
student by another, and for a profit.”). 
166 Id. at 1395 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (“Neither the District Court nor our Court 
provides a rationale as to why the copyshops cannot ‘stand in the shoes’ of their customers 
in making copies for noncommercial, educational purposes where the copying would be 
fair use if undertaken by the professor or the student personally.”).  But see id. at 1386 n.2 
(“[I]f the fairness of making copies depends on what the ultimate consumer does with the 
copies, it is hard to see how the manufacture of pirated editions of any copyrighted work 
of scholarship could ever be an unfair use.”). 
167 Id. at 1398 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
168 Id. at 1395 (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
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and efficient.  The majority in the en banc decision didn’t necessarily 
overlook the beneficial economies created by a for-profit service that 
allowed the students to outsource the drudgery of making photocopies 
to an enterprise that could do it painlessly and cheaply.  But the 
majority, led by Judge David A. Nelson, thought that the balance of 
the equities shifts against fair use when someone is making money 
from copying copyrighted works and not sharing the profits with the 
copyright owners.169 
These positions can be transposed from the photocopying context 
into the time-shifting context.  Home video recording for time-
shifting is a fair use under Sony in part because it wasn’t palatable for 
the Supreme Court to turn all of those home viewers into copyright 
infringers and also because time-shifting on Betamax machines did 
little or no harm to the interests of the plaintiff copyright owners, who 
had already been paid for licensing the initial, real-time telecasts of 
their programming.170  Cablevision’s RS-DVR service should 
likewise be deemed a fair use because it is merely a more efficient 
 
169 Id. at 1389 (majority opinion).  The court wrote,  
 As to the proposition that it would be fair use for the students or professors to 
make their own copies, the issue is by no means free from doubt.  We need not 
decide this question, however, for the fact is that the copying complained of here 
was performed on a profit-making basis by a commercial enterprise. 
Id. 
 In addition, the dissenters overlooked what the majority saw as a significant fact in the 
case—the advantage gained by the copyshop that didn’t pay permission fees over its 
competitors that did.  “As noted above, most of the copyshops that compete with 
[Michigan Document Services] in the sale of coursepacks pay permission fees for the 
privilege of duplicating and selling excerpts from copyrighted works.  The three plaintiffs 
together have been collecting permission fees at a rate approaching $500,000 a year.”  Id. 
at 1387. 
 The policy arguments against fair use based on the feasibility of monitoring compliance 
and collecting fees from a commercial copying service (as opposed to individual users)—
considerations that were not directly addressed in Michigan Document by Judge Nelson—
were laid out by the Second Circuit in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 
F.3d 913, 929–32 (2d Cir. 1994), a case that Judge Nelson cited approvingly.  See 
Michigan Document, 99 F.3d at 1387. 
170 See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449–50 
(1984).  The court stated, 
[W]hen one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual work and 
that time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a work which he had been 
invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the entire work is 
reproduced does not have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair 
use. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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way of continuing to do what already has been legally done for over 
twenty-five years. 
The argument on the other side would be that network-based 
storage and retrieval systems create new opportunities for exploiting 
copyrighted works.  These opportunities are comparable to the new 
opportunities for exploiting scholarly and educational works created 
by the photocopying machines in Michigan Document.  In their 
amicus brief to the Supreme Court, the performing rights societies, 
ASCAP and BMI, highlighted the scale of Cablevision’s 
infringements through its RS-DVR service. 
So, for example, an episode of the AMC cable network program 
Mad Men might be transmitted by Cablevision on a given Sunday 
night at 10 p.m., in its scheduled time slot.  If just 1% of 
Cablevision’s subscribers—approximately 30,000 households—
elect to use the RS-DVR system to watch the episode at a later time, 
30,000 households receive transmissions from Cablevision of that 
episode that they watch at those later times as the program arrives 
by cable at their home televisions.  According to the Second Circuit, 
these are 30,000 “private” performances of the same exact episode, 
all transmitted from Cablevision’s central “head-end” by cable to its 
subscribers’ households.  And of course, Cablevision can charge its 
subscribers for the privilege of watching these supposedly “private” 
performances.171 
Taken one by one, Cablevision’s RS-DVR infringements may be 
negligible, but as a whole, they will likely amount to sizeable 
business opportunities for Cablevision and other service providers to 
exploit.  That is why ASCAP and BMI claimed that “the Second 
Circuit’s decision creates a loophole in the copyright law through 
which all sorts of commercial media companies could seek to avoid 
paying public performance license fees.”172 
The response to this claim would be that the market for RS-DVR 
copies and performances didn’t exist until Cablevision invented it by 
inventing the RS-DVR.  Why isn’t this new use presumptively fair 
rather than presumptively unfair?  As Judge Ryan put it in his 
 
171 Brief for Amici Curiae Broadcast Music, Inc. and American Society of Composers, 
Authors & Publishers in Support of Petitioners at 7 Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2890 (2009) (No. 08-448), 2008 WL 4843617. 
172 Id. at 6; see also Michael Robertson, Cartoon Network Opens Door for Wave of New 
Business Opportunities, MICHAEL’S MINUTE (July 27, 2009) http://michaelrobertson.com 
/archive.php?minute_id=299 (“This favorable ruling on behalf of Cablevision also opens 
the door to a wide range of potential new features and services which can smartly record 
media.”). 
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Michigan Document dissent, “[t]he argument that . . . [the copyshop’s] 
publication of unauthorized compilations interferes with their ability 
to obtain licensing fees from other copyshops simply returns the 
publishers to their original circular argument that they are entitled to 
permission fees, in part, because they are losing permission fees.”173  
The viability of the market for permission fees, in other words, 
depended on the scope of the publishers’ copyrights.  If the 
copyshop’s unauthorized use of the publishers’ books was indeed a 
fair one, then the publishers had no right to demand permission fees 
in the first place. 
This is why Judge Ryan thought an initial finding that the 
copyshop wasn’t engaged in fair use couldn’t be based on its refusal 
to pay permission fees.  The market for permission fees, he 
maintained, wouldn’t legitimately come into being until after the 
copyshops found out that they were legally obliged to pay them.  This 
lesson, carried forward to Cartoon Network, implies that the Second 
Circuit would have to decide for itself whether the licensing market 
for RS-DVR copies and performances should exist and, if so, what its 
boundaries should be.  In that undertaking, it would have to base its 
decision on its own disinterested assessment of whether Cablevision’s 
RS-DVR will be either “time-shifting” under a different guise or 
“video on demand” under a different guise or, if neither of the two, 
which one it will more closely resemble.174 
CONCLUSION 
In Cartoon Network, the Second Circuit was asked to review the 
relationship between copies and performances in the context of a 
direct infringement claim against Cablevision that was brought by a 
consortium of movie and television studios.  The sequence of 
 
173 99 F.3d at 1408–09. 
174 See Cablevision Reply Brief, supra note 65, at 43–45.  Cablevision pointed out that 
RS-DVR’s functionality will be more limited than VOD’s because the RS-DVR subscriber 
will have to select in advance the programming to be recorded, and will be restricted in 
choice to content that was originally telecast on the network’s linear programming 
schedule.  Id.  These may or may not be distinctions that make a legal difference in the 
context of fair use. 
 One could respond that it makes just as much sense to treat copies made through 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR service differently from copies made on “set-top” DVRs as it does 
to treat VOD video rentals differently from hard copy video rentals.  The function in both 
cases is the same (RS-DVR time-shifting is a type of time-shifting, just as VOD video 
rentals are a type of video rental), but the implementing technology is different, and 
perhaps that means the copyright consequences should be different as well. 
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questions raised by the facts in the case resembled a copyright law 
exam devised by an especially devious professor. 
Will Cablevision make unauthorized copies of the studios’ 
programming by copying its entire programming stream into its RS-
DVR intake buffer, even though these buffer copies will only persist 
for a matter of seconds before being erased or transferred to the 
personal folders of its individual subscribers?175  If not, will the 
automated copying and storage of individual media files on behalf of 
its subscribers represent “volitional” copying, for which Cablevision 
itself should be held directly or contributorily liable?  Regardless of 
whether Cablevision or its subscribers will be responsible for creating 
the RS-DVR copies, will those copies be “publicly” performed by 
Cablevision when Cablevision streams performances of the copies 
through its cable network to the subscribers who ordered them?  
Finally, had it been found liable, could Cablevision’s infringements 
have been excused as a fair use? 
I have narrowed my focus here to the difficulties presented by the 
statutory definition of public performance, particularly the “transmit 
clause” and its puzzling provision that says a transmission of a 
performance to the public qualifies as public performance even if the 
performance is received by the public in “separate places” and at 
“different times.”  The Second Circuit, in my view, decided the case 
wrongly, at least on this issue.  The principal error in the court’s 
interpretation of the transmit clause was that it failed to see that the 
phrase “separate places/different times” refers to what are now known 
as “interactive services.”  The principal error in the court’s 
application of the transmit clause was that it substituted the word 
“transmission” for the word “performance” in the phrase “capable of 
receiving the performance,” which led it to mistakenly conclude that 
each RS-DVR transmission will represent a private rather than a 
public performance because only the subscriber whose cable box is 
 
175 See Aaron K. Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1441685.  So far, 
the buffer copy issue in Cartoon Network has attracted more scholarly interest than the 
public performance one.  This may be because it appears to have opened a circuit split 
between the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit.  Cf. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, 
Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518–19 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that random access memory (RAM) 
into which copyrighted software has been loaded may contain an infringing, fixed copy, 
despite its apparent transience).  Also, of course, the buffer copy issue is relevant to the 
question of whether streaming music services must pay composers and music publishers 
for § 115 mechanical licenses (discussed in supra note 80). 
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associated with that RS-DVR copy will be capable of receiving that 
RS-DVR transmission. 
Had the court instead focused on who will be capable of receiving 
the performance that will be embodied in the RS-DVR copy, it would 
have found that every customer who has a subscription to 
Cablevision’s linear programming schedule will be capable of 
receiving the performance preserved in the RS-DVR copies of that 
particular telecast.  The transmission of a performance of an RS-DVR 
copy to an individual’s cable box, even though that transmission will 
go only to one subscriber, should have been found to be a public 
performance because RS-DVR will be an interactive service that will 
enable public performances to be received by subscribers who pay for 
the convenience of receiving their performances (or, if you will, 
accessing their RS-DVR copies) in “separate places” and at “different 
times.” 
The difficulty with which the court grappled on the public 
performance issue came from the coincidence of these four 
complicating factors: 
(1) uncertainty about the statutory definition of public 
performance (specifically, what does the “separate places/different 
times” provision refer to?); 
(2) the legal fictions of the “mechanical copy” and the “multiple 
performance” doctrines that were devised by the Supreme Court in 
the early twentieth century, and carried over in the Copyright Act of 
1976, to accommodate the new technologies of recorded sound and 
radio broadcasting; 
(3) an authoritative commentary by Professor Nimmer that, over 
the past thirty-plus years, has had the untoward effect of locking the 
transmit clause’s jurisprudence into an anachronistic focus on single 
copies made in an outmoded technology; and 
(4) the mystifying character of the digital copy itself, which fixes 
a work of authorship in permanent form but does so by creating a 
textual form of zeros and ones that is just as intangible as the 
authorial expression it embodies. 
Finally, behind it all, the court in Cartoon Network had to deal with 
the ongoing and inescapable fact that works of authorship may be 
manifested in both copies and performances, as well as in copies of 
performances, while, more easily than ever before and in limitless 
seriality, performances can be copied, and copies performed.  When a 
copy of a performance of a work is performed, what is being 
performed—a work or a copy?  The question sounds like a riddle, but 
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it has practical consequences.  See, for example, the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Cartoon Network. 
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